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Saving Justice: Why Sentencing Errors Fall Within
the Savings Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)
BRANDON HASBROUCK*

Notwithstanding the extent to which scholars, lawyers, and community
organizers are broadening their contestations of the criminal justice system, they have paid insufficient attention to federal sentencing regimes.
Part of the reason for this is that sentencing is a “back-end” criminal
justice problem and much of our nation’s focus on criminal justice issues
privileges “front-end” problems like policing. Another explanation might
be that the rules governing sentencing are complex and cannot be easily
rearticulated in the form of political soundbites. Yet sentencing regimes
are a criminal justice domain in which inequalities abound—and in ways
that raise profound questions about fairness, due process, and justice.
This is particularly true regarding the draconian conditions placed on
federal prisoners’ abilities to challenge their unlawful sentences under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A federal prisoner’s sentence is unlawful when courts—the Supreme
Court or a controlling circuit court—wrongly interpret a statute that significantly enhanced the prisoner’s sentencing range. After the person is sentenced and files a direct appeal and initial 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, the
court corrects its errors and determines that correction to be retroactive.
The federal prisoner returns to the sentencing court and requests to be sentenced under the correct, unenhanced sentencing range, as the original sentence is no longer authorized by law. There is a deep circuit split regarding
whether federal prisoners may seek post-conviction relief for these sentencing claims under the savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)—the procedural
vehicle that allows federal prisoners access to the court to challenge an
unlawful sentence under the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
This Article’s significance is twofold. First, because courts have struggled to discern the meaning of the savings clause, this Article provides a
text-based interpretation of section 2255(e) that is grounded in the statute’s text and is consistent with its structure and purpose. Second, this
Article proposes a doctrinal test that courts should adopt in analyzing
sentencing claims brought under the savings clause. Specifically, this
Article proposes that relief under the savings clause is appropriate when
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the claim relies on a retroactively applicable decision of statutory interpretation, the claim was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of
the initial section 2255 motion, and the claim involves a fundamental
defect in the sentence. This Article contends that any error that alters the
statutory range Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or the
floor—raises separation of powers and due process concerns and is thus
a fundamental defect in criminal proceedings. In short, federal prisoners
should be able to access courts to raise their sentencing claims consistent
with this Article’s proposal.
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“There is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at a
point where it ought properly never to repose.”1

INTRODUCTION
Inmates are sitting in federal prisons serving unlawful sentences.2 Many will
die in those prisons serving “unjust” sentences.3 Nonetheless, some courts have
held, wrongly, that these federal prisoners are foreclosed from any avenue of
post-conviction relief under the habeas savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), thus
depriving “the convict of the most basic liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of which
does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”4 In so doing, these courts arguably render the savings clause a nullity in violation of the Suspension Clause of
the United States Constitution—the constitutional provision that guarantees that
the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended absent narrow circumstances.5
Section 2255 includes the congressionally created statutory remedy for federal prisoners to challenge the validity of their convictions and sentences after
their convictions become final.6 Because Congress imposed “a litany of draconian conditions on prisoners’ ability to challenge their convictions” through a
successive section 2255 motion, federal prisoners turn to the general habeas
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, to seek relief from their conviction and, in some
cases, their subsequent sentence.7 “Congress explicitly allowed some prisoners
1. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
2. The Department of Justice estimated that in 2015 (the latest year for which it has published
statistics), there were 328,500 people in federal correctional custody. See Danielle Kaeble & Lauren
Glaze, BUREAU of JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2015, at 12 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus15.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8DPZ-9NH7].
3. See, e.g., United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 269 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting),
reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015) (explaining that the district court was “required to
impose a life sentence” even though “it was [] unjust”) .
4. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 70 (2010) (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300–01 (1983)).
5. The Suspension Clause provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012); see also Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and Johnson Resentencing
(This Is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 67 (2017) (explaining that section 2255 “is the
congressionally-created post-conviction remedy for federal prisoners”).
7. Litman, supra note 6, at 68–70.
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to do just that”8 in federal cases with the savings clause, section 2255(e).9
Specifically, this provision allows a federal prisoner to file a petition for federal
habeas corpus pursuant to section 2241, when the “remedy” provided by section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”10
Thus, in essence, the savings clause is an important lynchpin in our constitutional structure: it ensures that there must be an adequate substitute procedure
for habeas corpus—the principle that prisoners must have a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that they are being held pursuant to an erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law—to be in compliance with the Suspension
Clause.11
The question presented in this Article—whether sentencing errors can be pursued under the savings clause, section 2255(e)—goes to the heart of the integrity,
fairness, and credibility of our criminal justice system.12 The answer, which finds
support in the text, purpose, and history of the savings clause, must be yes. Yet,
as demonstrated by two recent cases, courts have struggled to interpret the savings clause.
Raymond Surratt Jr. pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine when he
was thirty-one years old.13 Surratt was sentenced to a mandatory minimum life
term.14 Everyone agreed Surratt’s sentence was unjust—the government, the district court, and the public15—because the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted the
requirements for a predicate felony for an enhanced sentence under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA).16 That correction came after Surratt was sentenced and filed his direct appeal and first section 2255 motion.17 Under the
correct interpretation, Surratt’s sentencing range was twenty years to life imprisonment, not a mandatory life term.18 The district court made clear during
Surratt’s sentencing that if the court had discretion, the court would have likely
sentenced Surratt to twenty years because a life sentence was “undeserved and

8. Id. at 70.
9. See Prousalis v. Moore, 751 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 2014) (stating that a prisoner “may file a
habeas petition under § 2241 only if the collateral relief typically available under § 2255 ‘is inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e))).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008).
12. I share Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s deep concern that many people already, including myself, lack
confidence in the criminal justice system. See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–71 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Until . . . voices [of people of color] matter too, our justice system will
continue to be anything but.”).
13. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g
granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
14. Id. at 244 (majority opinion).
15. See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, All Agree His Sentence Was Too Harsh, but He May Still Stay
Locked up Forever, WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/
all-agree-his-sentence-was-too-harsh-but-he-may-still-stay-locked-up-forever/2016/03/22/0d34aea2ed3e-11e5-bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html?utm_term=.ae57c2646c83.
16. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (2012).
17. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 244–46.
18. Id. at 269 (Gregory, J., dissenting) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)).
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unjust.”19 Surratt pursued habeas relief via the savings clause in the form of resentencing.20 A divided panel on the Fourth Circuit said that “its hands [were]
tied because Surratt received ‘only’ a life sentence, and not more than the statutory maximum.”21 A stinging dissent followed by Judge Roger L. Gregory, contending that “[b]y foreclosing any avenue for post-conviction relief, the majority
essentially punishes Surratt for not having received the death penalty.”22 Before
the Fourth Circuit could address this issue en banc, President Barack Obama
commuted Surratt’s sentence, mooting the appeal.23
In McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., the maximum
sentence that Dan Carmichael McCarthan could serve—based on his conviction
for being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—was
ten years.24 The district court, however, sentenced him to seventeen years
and seven months, concluding that he was eligible for an enhanced sentence
under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).25 The court based its conclusion, in part, on the district court’s determination—supported by then-existing
precedent26—that McCarthan’s previous conviction for walk-away escape was
a “crime of violence” under the ACCA, and thus qualified as one of the three
predicate convictions that justified the sentencing enhancement.27 After
the district court adjudicated McCarthan’s section 2255 motion, the Supreme
Court held in Chambers v. United States that walk-away escape is not a crime
of violence.28 Chambers therefore confirmed that there was never a legal
basis for the sentence—seven years and seven months above the statutory
maximum—the district court imposed on McCarthan. At this point, the only
procedural vehicle available to McCarthan to have his sentence corrected by
the district court was the savings clause, § 2255(e).
Federal circuit courts are split on whether these sentencing-error claims can be
pursued under the savings clause. In particular, the circuits are divided on
19. Id.
20. See id. at 244 (majority opinion).
21. Id. at 269–70 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 270.
23. See United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017).
24. 851 F.3d 1076, 1080 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).
25. Id.
26. See id.; United States v. Gay, 251 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the reasoning
of these courts and now hold that a prior escape conviction qualifies as a ‘crime of violence’ under the
career offender guideline.” (citation omitted)), abrogated by United States v. Chambers, 473 F.3d 724
(7th Cir. 2007).
27. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080. McCarthan had three prior felony convictions: “(1) a 1987
conviction in Florida for possession of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver; (2) a 1992 conviction in
Florida for escape; and (3) a 1994 conviction in Florida for third-degree murder.” Id. at 1120. At the
time of sentencing, there was a mandatory-minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment if the
defendant “ha[d] three previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both,
committed on occasions different from one another.” See 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1) (2012). Had the escape
conviction not counted as a “crime of violence,” the mandatory minimum sentence would not have been
triggered.
28. 555 U.S. 122, 130 (2009) (holding that some forms of the crime of escape do not qualify as a
“violent felony” under ACCA (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii))).
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whether, and under what circumstances, federal prisoners can resort to the savings clause when they are serving an enhanced sentence that is no longer authorized by law. The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits routinely deny relief
to federal prisoners seeking habeas relief in the form of resentencing.29 Those
courts have interpreted section 2255(e) to provide relief—if at all—only in rare
cases, such that a person can show that they are actually innocent of the underlying crime.30 Consequently, habeas petitions that claim only sentencing errors—
no matter how egregious those errors are—often fail because courts lack jurisdiction to consider them. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have concluded that some
sentencing errors can be addressed under the savings clause. Even still, this
review only occurs in those instances in which the current sentence falls outside
of the maximum sentence allowable under law or “shares similarities with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory maximum.”31 Additionally, the
Fourth Circuit recently held that a sentencing claim can be addressed if the sentence presents an “error sufficiently grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.”32
Because McCarthan was sentenced in the Eleventh Circuit rather than, for
example, the Seventh Circuit, he was denied any relief.33 There is little doubt that
he would have been released from prison long ago had he been sentenced in the
Seventh Circuit. Instead, McCarthan was imprisoned for seven years and seven
months longer than Congress authorized. Whether McCarthan was entitled to any
remedy for this injustice should not have been determined based on the circuit in
which he was sentenced. Moreover, it appears that only the Fourth Circuit would
consider Surratt’s claim because, although there was a significant mistake in the
mandatory minimum baseline—life imprisonment instead of twenty years—his
sentence remains within the statutory guidelines range Congress authorized:
twenty years to life imprisonment.
In an effort to resolve this deep circuit split, this Article does two important
things. First, this Article provides a text-based interpretation of section 2255(e)
that is grounded in the statute’s text and consistent with its structure and purpose.34 To date, courts have struggled to interpret or give any substantive
29. See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2017); McCarthan, 851
F.3d at 1079–80; Bradford v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Prost v. Anderson,
636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011).
30. See, e.g., Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We therefore hold
that the savings clause of § 2255 applies to a claim (i) that is based on a retroactively applicable
Supreme Court decision which establishes that the petitioner may have been convicted of a nonexistent
offense and (ii) that was foreclosed by circuit law at the time when the claim should have been raised in
the petitioner’s trial, appeal, or first § 2255 motion.” (emphasis added)).
31. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583,
587–88 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a miscarriage of justice occurs when a federal prisoner’s sentence
“exceed[s] that permitted by law”).
32. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018).
33. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1100.
34. Textualism is a method of statutory interpretation that aims to construe statutes according to the
plain or ordinary meaning of the text. See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory
Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 204 (2018). Although there is debate amongst jurists and scholars on
what the best method of statutory interpretation is or should be, the Supreme Court has repeatedly made
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meaning to the savings clause.35 Second, based on that interpretation, this
Article proposes a workable doctrinal test that courts should adopt in analyzing sentencing claims brought under the savings clause. Specifically, this
Article proposes that relief under the savings clause is appropriate when the
claim relies on a retroactively applicable decision of statutory interpretation,
the claim was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of the initial section 2255 motion, and the claim involves a fundamental defect in the sentence. This Article contends that any error that alters the statutory range
Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or the floor—raises separation of powers and due process concerns and is thus a fundamental defect in the
criminal proceedings. In these instances, federal prisoners—like McCarthan
and Surratt—should have the ability to seek relief under the habeas savings
clause, as that clause is a tool meant to be available to any persons who find
themselves in prison when they ought not to be there.36
Ultimately, although this Article takes the position that its interpretive framework is workable, I predict that courts will continue to take a case-by-case
approach to this issue, unless and until the Supreme Court addresses the current
circuit split. In other words, courts prefer to resolve the cases before them as narrowly as possible instead of creating broad rules. Courts are concerned with the finality of judgments and judicial expediency; a broad rule may open the
proverbial floodgates to collateral attack on sentences.37 Those concerns are
clear that “[s]tatutory interpretation [always] begins with the text.” Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856
(2016) (citing Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010)). In any event, the
interpretive outcome advanced in this Article is likely under any method of statutory interpretation
because the statute’s text, structure, and purpose all support this Article’s interpretation of the savings
clause.
35. Compare Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011) (interpreting the savings
clause to not allow any relief for actual innocence claims or sentencing claims), with Gardner v. Warden
Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03 (3d Cir. 2017) (interpreting the savings clause to conclude that
only actual innocence claims are cognizable), and Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429 (interpreting the savings
clause to allow both actual innocence and sentencing claims).
36. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 731 (2016) (“A conviction or sentence imposed in
violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void. It follows,
as a general principle, that a court has no authority to leave in place a conviction or sentence that violates
a substantive rule, regardless of whether the conviction or sentence became final before the rule was
announced.” (citation omitted)).
37. See, e.g., Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1334 (11th Cir. 2011) (Martin, J., dissenting)
(“Finality is valued in our system insofar as it promotes certain principles: (1) to build confidence in the
integrity of the judicial system; (2) to minimize administrative costs and delay; (3) to avoid spoilation of
evidence; and (4) to honor comity.” (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n.11 (1979)));
Prost, 636 F.3d at 582–83 (“The principle of finality, the idea that at some point a criminal conviction
reaches an end, a conclusion, a termination, ‘is essential to the operation of our criminal justice
system.’” (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989))); see also Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 184 n.11
(1979) (“[I]ncreased volume of judicial work associated with the processing of collateral attacks
inevitably impairs and delays the orderly administration of justice. Because there is no limit on the time
when a collateral attack may be made, evidentiary hearings are often inconclusive and retrials may be
impossible if the attack is successful.” (citation omitted)); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 451–53 (1963) (discussing the
benefits of finality, including the “conservation of resources,” efficiency, and deterrence credibility in
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real.38 But, such concerns should not take precedence over justice. And,
justice requires resorting to the savings clause to correct fundamental sentencing errors. Any other interpretations of the habeas savings clause, this
Article argues, likely violate the Suspension Clause of the United States
Constitution.
After all, the fairness, integrity, and legitimacy of the judicial system is seriously undermined—if not permanently damaged—when courts deny federal
prisoners the right to pursue meritorious challenges to their unlawful detention.
Therefore, unless and until the Supreme Court resolves the current circuit split
in favor of allowing sentencing claims to proceed through the habeas savings
clause, we must ask: “what reasonable citizen wouldn’t bear a rightly diminished view of the judicial process and its integrity if courts refused to correct
obvious errors of their own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger
longer in federal prison than the law demands?”39
The discussion below proceeds as follows. Part I of this Article discusses the
statutory background of the savings clause. There, this Article reviews the development of section 2255 and discusses how the provisions of section 2255 interact.
Though other scholars have broadly described this statutory framework, my
account will put these dimensions of this area of law into sharp relief. Part II provides an overview of the current circuit split. As I will explain, central to this split
is the question over the meaning of the savings clause. Part III provides a textbased interpretation of section 2255(e) that is grounded in the statute’s text and
consistent with its purpose and structure. Based on this interpretation, I propose a
doctrinal test to address sentencing claims. Part IV argues that there are serious
constitutional concerns when courts wrongly interpret a federal statute that results
in a sentencing ceiling or floor increase, such as an increased mandatoryminimum sentence. Finally, Part V discusses United States v. Surratt and applies
this Article’s proposal to those facts. Surratt deserves more discussion for two
criminal law). None of these principles are advanced, in my view, in denying federal prisoners’ relief
from unlawful sentences. Consider Judge Martin’s dissent in Gilbert:
First, denying relief does not build confidence in our court system because this looks to the
world like a court refusing to acknowledge or make amends for its own mistake. Second, to
the extent that there have been administrative costs and delay in considering [the federal
prisoner’s] request for relief, they have already been incurred and [the court] need only grant
him that relief to end [the federal prisoner’s] very expensive incarceration.
640 F.3d at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Sun Bear v. United States, 644 F.3d 700, 712 (8th Cir.
2011) (Melloy, J., dissenting) (“I find the sole justification for the majority’s holding today to be an
uncompelling and unjust denial of process resting on hollow claims of a need to promote finality.”).
“Third, because the only issue before [the court] is a purely legal one, there is no evidence that [courts]
must consult.” Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1334 (Martin, J., dissenting). “And finally,” these cases present “no
comity concerns insofar as [federal prisoners seek] to correct a sentence imposed in federal court and not
by the state.” Id.
38. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1337 (Hill, J., dissenting) (“I recognize that without finality there can be
no justice. But it is equally true that, without justice, finality is nothing more than a bureaucratic
achievement.”).
39. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333–34 (10th Cir. 2014)).
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reasons. First, the case highlights that not only does a sentence above the statutory
maximum present a fundamental defect—any error that alters the statutory range
Congress prescribed for punishment is a fundamental defect, as explained below.
Second, and equally as important, is that people with claims similar to Surratt’s
are still sitting in prison serving unlawful sentences.
I. THE “SAVINGS CLAUSE”
“The writ of habeas corpus is of such fundamental importance to this nation’s
legal system that it is known as the Great Writ.”40 In the Framers’ view, “freedom
from unlawful restraint [i]s a fundamental precept of liberty.”41 The “vital instrument to secure that freedom” was the writ of habeas corpus.42 For this reason,
contained in the very blueprint of our nation—the Constitution—is the prohibition on suspension of the writ.43 Specifically, at the constitutional convention, the
Framers decided not to include an affirmative guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus, but instead a provision that prohibited the writ’s suspension.44 A few years
later in its first session, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, section 14 of
which granted federal courts the power to issue habeas writs and is codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C § 2241.45 Congress bestowed on “the courts broad remedial
powers to secure the historic office of the writ.”46
Congress amended section 2241 several times, including in 1948.47 The 1948
recodification added section 2255 to the statutory scheme, which provided a new
motion by which federal prisoners could seek post-conviction relief, separate and
apart from an application for a writ of habeas corpus under section 2241.48 The
main impetus for section 2255 was to address concerns that federal courts located
near prisons were flooded by petitions from prisoners who, until that point, were
40. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1113 (11th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (Martin, J., dissenting) (citing Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807)), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).
41. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008).
42. See id.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
44. See id.; Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process, and the
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 VA. L. REV. 1361,
1370–72 (2010) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1987, at 438 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966) (discussing the debate over habeas corpus and the Suspension Clause at the
Constitutional Convention)).
45. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C § 2241
(2012)). The “[p]ower to issue the writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the English law,
was granted to the federal courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789.” United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
210 (1952) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). In Hayman, the Supreme Court reviewed
the reasons for passage of § 2255. Id. The Court recognized the role of section 2241 for those cases in
which section 2255 cannot provide relief, stating that “[i]n a case where the Section 2255 procedure is
shown to be ‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy [in § 2241]
shall remain open to afford the necessary hearing.” Id. at 223.
46. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776.
47. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1056–58 (11th Cir. 2003) (providing the legislative
history of post-conviction relief statutes).
48. See id. at 1056.
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required by section 2241 to apply for writs in the district of their confinement.49
In this way, section 2255 “replaced traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners
. . . with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion with the sentencing
court.”50 Importantly, the Supreme Court has confirmed on several occasions that
section 2255 was never meant to abridge the writ, but was simply crafted to
address practical concerns of habeas administration.51
The 1948 amendments also gave birth to the so-called “savings clause” found
in section 2255(e). This section provides that a federal prisoner may not apply for
the traditional writ of habeas corpus under section 2241 unless the remedy under
section 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [] detention.”52
The full text reads as follows:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.53

Legislative history provides hardly any explanation for the inclusion of this
language.54 In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has described the savings clause as ensuring that subsequently enacted limitations in section 2255,
described below, do not run afoul of the Suspension Clause.55 As a result of these

49. See Hayman, 342 U.S. at 210–13 (“These practical problems have been greatly aggravated by the
fact that the few District Courts in whose territorial jurisdiction major federal penal institutions are
located were required to handle an inordinate number of habeas corpus actions . . . .”).
50. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 774.
51. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974) (“Th[e] [legislative] history makes clear
that § 2255 was intended to afford federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas
corpus.”); id. at 344 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255 do we find any purpose to impinge upon
prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”); Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 427
(1962) (“[I]t conclusively appears from the historic context in which § 2255 was enacted that the
legislation was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a remedy exactly commensurate with
that which had previously been available by habeas corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner
was confined.” (footnote omitted)); Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219 (“Nowhere in the history of Section 2255
do we find any purpose to impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.”);
see also In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 332–33 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing the practical problems, including
“the large number of habeas petitions filed in districts containing federal correctional facilities” (citing
Hyman, 342 U.S. at 212–14)). Congress’s “purpose and effect” in enacting section 2255, therefore, “was
not to restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more efficient.” Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 775.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
53. Id.
54. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1240–42 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Unfortunately, we have found
nothing in the legislative history explaining why the relevant language was changed or what the new
language means.”), overruled by McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d
1076 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
55. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (“The Court placed explicit reliance upon [the savings clause]
in upholding [section 2255] against constitutional challenges.” (citation omitted)); see also Hayman,
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collective 1948 amendments, “the § 2255 motion has displaced the writ of habeas
corpus under § 2241 as the basic collateral remedy for persons confined pursuant
to a federal criminal conviction.”56
The next significant statutory habeas amendments occurred with the 1996 passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Congress
accomplished two important things in AEDPA. First, although AEDPA imposed
new restrictions on federal prisoners’ ability to file multiple section 2255 motions
challenging their convictions and sentences,57 those restrictions merely “statutorily
codified the abuse of writ doctrine,” a common law doctrine designed to prevent the
abuse of habeas corpus.58 Specifically, as the Supreme Court has told us, AEDPA
was concerned with preventing “habeas-by-sandbagging” and repeated re-litigation
of the same claims.59 Indeed, in section 2255(h), Congress expressly permitted federal prisoners to file successive petitions to challenge the legality of their convictions
or sentences in either of the following circumstances: through new evidence of factual innocence or through a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law.60
Second, and paramount, Congress, re-codified the saving clause as a new statutory subsection in AEDPA, “leaving open a safety valve for federal prisoners ‘to
test the legality of [their] detention’ where Section 2255, as revised, proved ‘inadequate or ineffective’—including where they had been ‘denied . . . relief’ on an
earlier Section 2255 motion.”61 In other words, Congress left intact the habeas
savings clause in section 2255(e) as a residual source of authority for federal
post-conviction relief, which “entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to
demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”62 Thus, section 2255 continues to preserve the core
function of habeas review, which is to provide prisoners a meaningful opportunity to challenge illegal convictions or sentences.63
In sum, sections 2255(e), 2255(h), and 2241 interact in the following way: A
federal prisoner may challenge his sentence by filing a motion under section
2255.64 After this first section 2255 motion, the prisoner must seek leave to file a

342 U.S. at 223 (declining to “reach constitutional questions” regarding section 2255 based on the
presence of the savings clause).
56. 7 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.9(a) (3d ed. 2007).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (2012).
58. Muniz v. United States, 236 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2001).
59. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180–86 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (stating that AEDPA promotes comity between state and federal courts by ensuring that the
state’s consideration of a petitioner’s claims are the “main event” rather than a “tryout on the road” to
federal court (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977))); see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S.
651, 664 (1996) (“The Act also codifies some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions . . . .”).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1)–(2).
61. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Petitioner at 4, McCarthan v.
Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3531410 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)).
62. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
63. See Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 421 (2013).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
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second one under section 2255(h), by the procedures set forth in § 2244.65 Relief
via the traditional writ of habeas corpus, authorized by section 2241, is not available unless the mechanism provided under section 2255 proves to be “inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”66
Although the history, purpose, and text of the savings clause is relatively clear,
federal circuit courts are divided on whether sentencing errors fall under the savings clause.
II. THE SPLIT: CIRCUIT COURTS DISAGREE ON WHETHER SENTENCING ERRORS ARE
COGNIZABLE UNDER THE SAVINGS CLAUSE
Most federal circuits agree—with the exception of the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits—that actual innocence claims67 are cognizable under the savings clause,
assuming specific procedural requirements are met.68 However, there is a solid
split between circuits on whether any sentencing error can pass through the habeas savings clause.69 The Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have

65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (referring to section 2244).
66. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
67. For an excellent discussion concerning actual innocence and habeas law, see generally Leah M.
Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV. 417 (2018) (distinguishing legal
innocence from factual innocence and explaining “how the existing federal habeas system can provide
relief to legally innocent defendants”).
68. Compare Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that actual innocence
claims may be pursed under the savings clause), Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012)
(same), Christopher v. Miles, 342 F.3d 378, 382–83 (5th Cir. 2003) (same), In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328,
333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611–12 (7th Cir. 1998) (same),
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377, 380 (2d Cir. 1997) (same), and In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
245, 248 (3d Cir. 1997) (same), with McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d
1076, 1079–80 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017), and Prost v.
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–86 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that actual innocence claims are not
cognizable under the savings clause).
69. Although the Second and Eighth Circuits have not directly weighed in on whether sentencing
errors are cognizable under the savings clause, it appears that some courts in those circuits would limit
relief to actual innocence claims based on existing precedent. In other words, those courts have not had
occasion to have that issue briefed, argued, and decided. See, e.g., Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70, 81
(2d Cir. 2019) (“We have interpreted the savings clause of subsection (e) to authorize a § 2241 petition
only when § 2255 is unavailable and the petition is filed by an individual who (1) can prove actual
innocence on the existing record, and (2) could not have effectively raised [his] claim[] of innocence at
an earlier time, perhaps due to an intervening change in the governing interpretation of the statute of
conviction.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Figueroa v.
Fernandez, No. 9:19-CV-0373-GLS, 2019 WL 1762584, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2019) (“Petitioner
has provided no allegations or evidence of actual innocence; therefore, he has failed to establish that this
exception applies.”); Aubin v. Beasley, No. 2:18-cv-00051-DPM/PSH, 2018 WL 5724450, at *5 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 12, 2018) (“Aubin is not imprisoned for an offense that is no longer a crime. . . . The savings
clause does not apply to such a claim.”).
The Ninth Circuit has expressly stated that they “have not yet resolved the question whether a
petitioner may ever be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence for the purpose of qualifying for the
escape hatch.” Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2012). Further, some courts in the First
Circuit have assumed, without deciding, that sentencing claims are cognizable under the savings clause.
See, e.g., Williams v. Spaulding, No. 18-cv-11554-KAR, 2019 WL 2107275, at *4 (D. Mass. May 14,
2019). The D.C. Circuit has yet to weigh in.
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unequivocally closed this door to federal prisoners.70 The Sixth and Seventh
Circuits have cracked the door open enough for prisoners to seek relief when they
are serving a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum or “shares similarities
with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory maximum.”71 And recently,
the Fourth Circuit significantly opened the door to relief that is mostly consistent
with the doctrinal test that this Article proposes.72
Although each of these courts grappled with the savings clause language—
some more exhaustively and intentionally than others—none fully recognized
that the plain meaning of the savings clause allows relief for sentencing errors
and that any other interpretation raises profound constitutional questions.
A. THE DOOR IS CLOSED
73

74

The Third, Fifth, Tenth,75 and Eleventh76 Circuits have had occasion to consider whether a sentencing claim is cognizable under the savings clause. These
courts, citing concerns of finality of judgments and judicial economy, have concluded that prisoners cannot resort to relief under the savings clause.77
In Gilbert v. United States, a case involving a collateral Begay claim,78 the
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, addressed the question of whether “the savings

70. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1079–80; Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 102–03
(3d Cir. 2017); Bradford v. Tamez, 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Prost, 636 F.3d at
584–86.
71. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583,
588 (7th Cir. 2013).
72. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419, 429 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that a federal
prisoner may file a successive claim for relief under section 2241 following change in substantive law
that is retroactively applicable on collateral review, when the sentence “presents an error sufficiently
grave to be deemed a fundamental defect” (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2255(e), 2255(h)(2) (2012))).
73. See Gardner, 845 F.3d at 103 (“[W]e [previously] recognized that § 2255’s savings clause
provides a safety valve for actual innocence, but without short-circuiting § 2255’s gatekeeping
requirements. Adopting Gardner’s approach—under which all sentencing issues based on new Supreme
Court decisions could be raised via § 2241 petitions—would accomplish just that.” (citation omitted)).
74. See Bradford, 660 F.3d at 230 (“[A]ctual innocence of a career offender enhancement is not a
claim of actual innocence of the crime of conviction and, thus, not the type of claim that warrants review
under § 2241.”).
75. The Tenth Circuit, undoubtedly, has the most restrictive savings clause jurisprudence. See Prost,
636 F.3d at 584–88 (concluding that actual innocence claims and sentencing claims are not cognizable
under the savings clause). However, the Eleventh Circuit recently entered the race for that title. In
McCarthan, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly relied on Prost’s reasoning to overturn its existing precedent
that allowed actual innocence and sentencing claims to pass through the savings clause. See 851 F.3d at
1080, 1095–1100 (“We join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law as Congress wrote it and hold that a
change in caselaw does not make a motion to vacate a prisoner’s sentence ‘inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.’” (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e))), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 502 (2017).
76. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080.
77. See, e.g., Prost, 636 F.3d at 583 (discussing the finality principle).
78. A Begay claim is one in which a petitioner claims an error in the application of the violent felony
enhancement, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which results in a higher statutory minimum and
maximum sentence under section 924(e). See Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (holding
that driving under the influence, while posing a serious risk of injury to others, is not an ACCA predicate
because the “conduct for which the drunk driver is convicted . . . need not be purposeful or deliberate”).
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clause of § 2255(e) appl[ies] to claims that the sentencing guidelines were
misapplied in the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines era in a way that resulted
in a substantially longer sentence that does not exceed the statutory maximum.”79 Before the Supreme Court held in Booker that the sentencing guidelines were only advisory, not mandatory, district courts had no discretion to
sentence a defendant outside of the guidelines range.80 The Eleventh Circuit
determined that savings clause relief is unavailable to pre-Booker sentences,
noting that the clause’s text “does not indicate that it authorizes the filing of
a § 2241 petition to remedy a miscalculation of the sentencing guidelines that
already has been, or may no longer be, raised in a § 2255 motion,”81 and citing the “finality-busting effects of permitting prisoners to use the savings
clause as a means of evading the second or successive motions bar.”82 These
policy interests prompted the court to “decline Gilbert’s invitation to undermine finality of judgment principles by using § 2255(e) to knock down the
second or successive motions bar that Congress constructed in § 2255(h)”
and conclude that sentencing claims cannot be brought under section 2241
via section 2255(e).83
Several vigorous dissents followed. The dissenters argued that not allowing
relief from a sentencing error that resulted in an additional eight and one-half
years of prison time for Gilbert was not only an extraordinary miscarriage of justice, but also violated the Suspension Clause.84 In particular, they argued that
“where the application of the statutory bar in § 2255(h) would deny [] federal
prisoner[s] such a meaningful opportunity” to demonstrate that they are being
held pursuant to the erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law, “the
savings clause must apply in order to avoid an unconstitutional suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus.”85 The dissenters contended that the majority adopted a
“Catch-22” approach to sentencing claims by not allowing federal prisoners to
seek relief under the habeas savings clause because those prisoners previously

79. 640 F.3d 1293, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). For an excellent account discussing Gilbert’s journey
through this case, see Alec Karakatsanis, The Punishment Bureaucracy: How to Think About “Criminal
Justice Reform,” 128 YALE L.J. F. 848, 869–70 (2019).
80. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
81. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1307.
82. Id. at 1309.
83. Id. at 1312; see also McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076,
1079–80 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). In McCarthan, the Eleventh
Circuit held that claims challenging the legality of a sentence cannot be brought under the savings
clause. See id. at 1085–90. The court reasoned that the savings clause is limited to claims challenging
the “execution of [a] sentence, such as the deprivation of good-time credits or parole determinations.”
Id. at 1092–93. A claim attacking the legality of a sentence can be brought only in two “limited
circumstances”: first, if “the sentencing court is unavailable” (for example, because the sentencing court
itself has been dissolved); or second, when some other “practical consideration[]” prevents the petitioner
from filing a section 2255 motion. Id. at 1093.
84. See Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1329–30 & n.3 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1329–30 (footnote omitted).
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filed a timely section 2255 motion that the court “erroneously rejected.”86 This
“judicial ‘gotcha,’” tethered to the pursuit of finality, “cast a pall of unconstitutionality over the otherwise beneficial provisions of § 2255.”87 The dissenters
concluded by noting that many others are in Gilbert’s position—sitting in prison
serving sentences that were illegally imposed: “We used to call such systems
‘gulags.’ Now, apparently, we call them the United States.”88
Similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Gilbert, the Third and
Fifth Circuits, in cursory opinions, held that federal prisoners cannot pursue relief
under the savings clause to challenge their statuses as career offenders or their
mandatory minimum sentences. They reasoned that the savings clause is available only to prisoners asserting actual innocence claims—meaning that they were
convicted of a nonexistent crime.89 In both cases, the court failed to engage in
any meaningful interpretation of the text of the savings clause or provide any rationale as to why actual innocence claims are constitutionally different than sentencing error claims.
The Tenth Circuit in Prost v. Anderson addressed whether, and under what circumstances, the savings clause allows a federal prisoner to file a habeas petition
under the general habeas corpus statute, section 2241.90 In an opinion authored by
then-Judge Gorsuch (now Justice Gorsuch), Prost held that section 2255(e) only
permits prisoners to challenge their convictions or sentences under the general
habeas statute, section 2241, if the prisoner’s detention could not “have been
tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”91 Meaning, “section 2241 [habeas relief] is
available only when a prisoner literally could not get to court to file an initial section 2255 motion, such as where ‘the defendant’s sentencing court had been abolished’ when the prisoner sought to file the initial section 2255 motion.”92

86. Id. at 1336 (Hill, J., dissenting). Chief Judge (then Circuit Judge) Roger L. Gregory of the Fourth
Circuit better explained this “Catch-22” in United States v. Surratt:
I suppose we just have fundamentally different views on the role of habeas corpus, as well as
the role of the judiciary in granting the writ. I see it as our solemn responsibility to guard
against a morbid encroachment upon that which is so precious our Framers ensured its continued vitality in our Constitution. Instead we guard the Great Writ itself, and so closely that
Surratt must spend the rest of his life in prison—against the will of the government and the
district court. Our abdication of this responsibility begs the question: quis custodiet ipsos
custodies? Who will guard the guards themselves?
It is within our power to do more than simply leave Surratt to the mercy of the executive
branch. To hope for the right outcome in another’s hands perhaps is noble. But only when
we actually do the right thing can we be just.
797 F.3d 240, 276 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2,
2015).
87. Gilbert, 640 F.3d at 1336 (Hill, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 1337.
89. See Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 845 F.3d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 2017); Bradford v. Tamez,
660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
90. See 636 F.3d 578, 584 (10th Cir. 2011).
91. Id. at 584, 588.
92. Litman, supra note 6, at 72 (emphasis added) (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 588).
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Judge Gorsuch provided several reasons to support his interpretation of section
2255(e). First, the “remedy” described in the statute’s text is concerned with the
process—not substance—of section 2255 proceedings, which only included the
“opportunity to bring [an] argument,” rather than to “win” it.93 Second, Congress,
when it enacted section 2255, “was surely aware that prisoners might seek to pursue second or successive motions based on newly issued statutory interpretation
decisions, but Congress did not allow those kinds of claims to be raised in successive motions.”94 Third, “several surrounding provisions emphasize ‘providing a
single opportunity to test arguments, rather than any guarantee of relief or
results.’”95 Finally, “section 2255 was enacted to allow federal prisoners to challenge their convictions and sentences in the district where they were sentenced,
rather than only in the district where they were incarcerated.”96 Section 2255,
according to Judge Gorsuch, “was not adopted to expand or impinge upon prisoners rights of collateral attack upon their convictions, but only to address the ‘difficulties that had arisen in administering habeas corpus.’”97
Significantly, Judge Gorsuch did not have to address any of these issues. As
Judge Seymour recognized in a separate opinion, Prost should have been decided
on a much narrower ground.98 Specifically, Prost had an “adequate and effective
opportunity to test the legality of his conviction [in his first section 2255 motion]
because he was not foreclosed by [any] precedent” to raise his actual innocent
claim of money laundering.99 Because Prost failed to raise this issue, Prost’s habeas petition could have been dismissed on that ground. Instead, Judge Gorsuch,
who on many occasions excoriated the Tenth Circuit for not exercising judicial
restraint,100 showed no restraint. In a sharp rebuke, Judge Seymour pointed out
that Judge Gorsuch’s opinion interpreting the savings clause “creat[ed] an
unnecessary circuit split on an issue that was neither raised by the parties nor
implicated by the facts of this case.”101 Before Prost, all circuits that addressed
claims of actual innocence agreed that, at a minimum, those claims were cognizable under the savings clause.102 But Judge Gorsuch would only allow claims
when a prisoner could not have filed an initial section 2255 motion because the

93. Prost, 636 F.3d at 584, 588.
94. See Litman, supra note 6, at 72–73 (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 585).
95. Id. at 73 (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587).
96. Id. (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587–88).
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prost, 636 F.3d at 587–88).
98. See Prost, 636 F.3d at 598–99 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 599.
100. See, e.g., Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1208 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (cautioning courts to “avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of
the necessity of deciding them” (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439,
445 (1988))); id. (“Caution is always warranted when venturing down the road of deciding a weighty
question of first impression . . . .”); Williams v. Jones, 583 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“It’s not every day we exacerbate a split of authority
over the recognition of a new constitutional right . . . .”).
101. Prost, 636 F.3d at 599 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
102. Id. at 604–05 (collecting cases).
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sentencing court had been abolished.103 Judge Seymour would have interpreted
the savings clause consistently with all other circuits at the time to allow actual
innocence claims to pass through.104
Crucially, as Professor Leah Litman correctly argues, Judge Gorsuch’s interpretation of the savings clause would not allow any of the following federal prisoners to challenge their convictions or sentences under section 2241: “prisoners
who were convicted of acts the law did not make criminal; prisoners who were
sentenced above the statutory maximum for their offense; or prisoners whose
convictions or sentences violated some substantive rule of constitutional law.”105
In other words, not only does Justice Gorsuch believe that no sentencing claims
are cognizable under the habeas savings clause, but he also believes that this
clause provides no relief for federal prisoners who are actually innocent of the
underlying offense. Troubling.106 Even more troubling is that the Eleventh
Circuit reached the same conclusion relying principally on Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning in Prost.107
In sum, none of these courts would allow a person to raise a sentencing claim,
yet there is significant disagreement in these courts’ interpretations of the savings
clause. For example, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits would allow relief only
when the sentencing court had been abolished or when a prisoner had been
deprived of good-time credits or parole determinations. The Third and Fifth
Circuits would allow claims that a person is actually innocent of the underling
offense, but not sentencing claims. The rationale behind all of these opinions
appears to be that courts have to draw the line somewhere. Animated by finality,
those courts decided to draw a line—a line unsupported by the text of the savings
clause—that strips habeas of liberty and keeps people in chains. Perhaps, as
Justice Brennan observed, these courts are just afraid “of too much justice.”108
B. HOLD THE DOOR

Whereas the door to habeas relief for sentencing errors has been closed in the
Third, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits have
cracked the door open in a slight, yet significant way. These courts make it clear
that some sentencing errors are cognizable under the savings clause.

103. Id. at 588 (majority opinion).
104. Id. at 603–06 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105. Litman, supra note 6, at 72 (citing Prost, 636 F.3d at 588–94).
106. Or, as Professor Litman, put it: “Ooph.” Id.
107. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).
108. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Judge William Pryor
articulated the same fear: “The law will forever be in a state of flux, and Congress in a state of
legislation. A federal prisoner’s sentence cannot always be vulnerable to collateral attack, lest the
finality of convictions ceases to exist.” Samak v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1293
(11th Cir. 2014) (Pryor, J., concurring). Judge Pryor subsequently authored the en banc majority in
McCarthan, which held that neither actual innocence claims nor sentencing claims are cognizable under
the savings clause. 851 F.3d at 1076.
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In Brown v. Caraway, the sentencing court applied a career offender enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, to Brown’s sentence for drugs and firearm possession in
light of prior convictions of second-degree assault and third-degree arson in
Delaware.109 Brown’s designation as a career offender resulted in an offenseguidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment.110 Because Brown was
sentenced pre-Booker, when guidelines ranges were mandatory, Brown was sentenced to 360 months.111 Absent the career offender enhancement, Brown’s
guidelines range would have been 262 to 327 months.112 Brown’s subsequent section 2255 petition was unsuccessful.113
Brown later filed a section 2241 petition challenging the enhancement because
his prior offense for third-degree arson no longer constituted a crime of violence
under Begay; thus, Brown should not have been sentenced under the career offender
enhancement.114 The district court dismissed the petition.115 The Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that Brown’s petition had satisfied the court’s three-part test to fall
within the savings clause exception and was, therefore, properly heard under section
2241.116 First, Brown relied on a case of statutory interpretation, rather than a “constitutional case,” which would have satisfied one of the conditions for a successive
challenge under section 2255(h).117 Second, Brown relied on a case determined retroactive by the Supreme Court that he could not have invoked in his original section
2255 motion.118 Finally, the sentencing error Brown complained of was sufficiently
grave to be “deemed a miscarriage of justice,” or, put another way, a “fundamental
defect” in the criminal process capable of being corrected in a habeas corpus proceeding.119 Specifically, because Brown was sentenced above his sentencing range,
that error was a “fundamental defect.”120
Importantly, in response to the argument that the savings clause requires “a
claim of actual innocence directed to the underlying conviction, not merely the
sentence,”121 the Seventh Circuit stood on the language of the savings clause, section 2255(e).122 The court noted that the savings clause makes no reference to
“convictions” but instead makes relief available where the “§ 2255 remedy is
‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’”123 Under this

109. 719 F.3d 583, 584–85 (7th Cir. 2013).
110. Id. at 585.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 586.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 586–89.
117. Id. at 586–87.
118. Id. at 586.
119. Id. (first quoting Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012); then quoting In re
Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998)).
120. Id. at 587–88.
121. Id. at 586.
122. Id. at 588.
123. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)).
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interpretation, the court reasoned that if a prisoner was sentenced when the guidelines were mandatory by law, then “a § 2241 habeas petition raising a guidelines
error ‘tests the legality of his detention.’”124 The Seventh Circuit thus found
Brown entitled to relief under section 2241.125
The Sixth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Hill v. Masters.126 Like the defendant in Brown, Hill was sentenced as a career offender under the pre-Booker
mandatory guidelines because he “had two prior felony convictions in Maryland—
a controlled-substance offense and second-degree assault.”127 With the career offender enhancement, “Hill was sentenced to 300 months of imprisonment based on
a [mandatory] guideline range of 292 to 365 months.”128 Had he not been sentenced as a career offender, Hill’s guideline range would have been 235 to 293
months.129 More importantly, because Hill was sentenced as a career offender, he
was not eligible for “subsequent retroactive amendments to the guidelines that
[would have] place[d] his guidelines range as low as 188 to 235 months.”130
Hill later filed a section 2241 petition challenging the enhancement because his
prior Maryland conviction for second-degree assault no longer constituted a
crime of violence under Descamps v. United States131 and the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Royal;132 thus, under those decisions, Hill should not
have been sentenced under the career offender enhancement.133 The Sixth Circuit
agreed, adopting Brown’s interpretation of the savings clause—that sentencing
claims are cognizable under the plain reading of section 2255.134 However, the
court’s decision applied to a “narrow subset” of section 2241 petitions:
(1) prisoners who were sentenced under the mandatory guidelines regime pre[Booker], (2) who are foreclosed from filing a successive petition under §

124. Id.
125. Id. at 596.
126. 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016).
127. Id. at 593.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 570 U.S. 254 (2013). In Descamps, the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession
of a firearm. Id. at 258. Because Descamps had a prior conviction for burglary, the district court imposed
a sentencing enhancement under the ACCA. Id. at 259. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id. The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Descamps’s prior conviction for burglary under California law was not a
violent felony within the meaning of the ACCA. Id. at 260. The elements of California burglary were
broader and therefore encompassed more potential conduct than did those of the generic burglary
offense. Id. at 274. Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the sentencing enhancement. Id. at 277–78.
132. 731 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit applied Descamps to Maryland’s seconddegree assault statute, one of Hill’s predicate felonies. Because Maryland’s second-degree assault
statute defined assault more broadly than the generic crime, the Fourth Circuit concluded it was not a
“violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. at 342. Specifically, “Maryland’s second-degree assault statute
reaches any unlawful touching, whether violent or nonviolent and no matter how slight”; thus,
“convictions under the statute . . . cannot categorically be crimes of violence.” Id. (quoting Karimi v.
Holder, 715 F.3d 561, 568 (4th Cir. 2013)).
133. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 593.
134. Id. at 599–600.
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2255, and (3) when a subsequent, retroactive change in statutory interpretation
by the Supreme Court reveals that a previous conviction is not a predicate
offense for a career-offender enhancement.135

The Sixth Circuit held that Hill satisfied its test because he “was sentenced
under the mandatory guidelines,” was “barred from filing a successive § 2255 petition; and received the [unlawful career offender] enhancement based on a prior
conviction that a subsequent, retroactive change in Supreme Court jurisprudence
[Descamps] reveal[ed was] not a predicate offense.”136 The court concluded, “[t]o
require that Hill serve an enhanced sentence as a career offender, bearing the
stigma of a ‘repeat violent offender’ and all its accompanying disadvantages, is a
miscarriage of justice where he lacks the predicate felonies to justify such a
characterization.”137
C. THE DOOR IS OPEN

Recently, the Fourth Circuit pushed the door open to federal prisoners to raise
sentencing errors that result in a fundamental defect in the criminal justice system. In United States v. Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit addressed whether a prisoner
can challenge his sentence under the savings clause when the sentence was
enhanced by a court under a mistaken understanding of the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”).138 That mistake resulted in a mandatory minimum sentence for Wheeler that doubled what it should have been under the correct interpretation of the CSA.139 The Fourth Circuit held that “[a]n increase in the
congressionally mandated minimum sentencing floor” is “an error sufficiently
grave to be deemed a ‘fundamental defect.’”140 Specifically, the court reasoned
that “when [a federal prisoner] never should have been subject to an increase[d
sentence] in the first place, the error is grave.”141 Why? “An increase in the congressionally mandated sentencing floor implicates separation of powers principles and due process rights fundamental to our justice system.”142 Therefore,
Wheeler was allowed to bring his claim under the habeas savings clause.143
*****
All of these cases turned on the courts’ interpretation of the statutory language
found in the savings clause, section 2255(e), which this Article now addresses.

135. Id. (citation omitted)
136. Id. at 600.
137. Id.
138. 886 F.3d 415, 419–22 (4th Cir. 2018).
139. See id. at 431.
140. Id. at 430.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. It appears that the Fourth Circuit will continue to take a case-by-case approach to sentencing
errors. See id. at 433 n.11 (“We make no decision regarding whether an erroneous sentence above the
statutory maximum is a fundamental defect for purposes of the savings clause. . . .”).
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III. THE SAVINGS CLAUSE TEXT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF
In all cases of statutory construction, the starting point to any analysis is to
examine the language of the statute for a “plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”144 The inquiry typically ends
here for courts if the statutory language is “unambiguous and the statutory
scheme is coherent and consistent.”145 The answer to whether the savings
clause allows for consideration of second or successive claims of at least some
sentencing species is determined by close examination of the statutory language. Paramount to this analysis is the Supreme Court’s command that habeas
corpus is governed by “equitable principles,”146 including the “principles of
fundamental fairness underl[ying] the writ.”147
Turning to the statutory language, the savings clause of section 2255(e) allows
a federal prisoner to seek a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2241 when
the “remedy” provided by section 2255 proves “inadequate or ineffective to test
the legality of . . . detention.”148 So, what does this mean?149
A. “REMEDY”

Courts that have concluded that sentencing claims fall outside of the habeas
savings clause contend that “remedy” refers to the process of challenging the prisoner’s conviction, not the outcome of that process.150 In other words, because section 2255(e) is concerned with process, not substance, so long as a federal
prisoner had the opportunity to bring an argument—never mind if Supreme Court
or circuit precedent foreclosed that argument—the remedy in section 2255 is
adequate and effective.
This interpretation is not only unpersuasive but is also inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has made clear that the correct inquiry is whether the process afforded by section 2255 can fairly be described as
providing “a meaningful opportunity” for relief—a nominal opportunity, as discussed in Part IV, is constitutionally insufficient.151 Moreover, the Court has
144. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)).
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 213 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
147. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 351 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000).
149. For a great historical account of the Suspension Clause, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537 (2010). In his account,
Professor Neuman states that the Supreme Court in “Boumediene and St. Cyr reiterated that what
matters is the substance, not the form, of the Great Writ. Congress can rename or reconfigure the
procedure by which courts examine the lawfulness of detention, so long as the new structure provides an
‘adequate and effective substitute for habeas corpus.’” Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
150. See, e.g., Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011).
151. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (emphasis added) (“We do consider it
uncontroversial, however, that the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful
opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’
of relevant law.” (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001))).
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stated that “a theoretically available procedural alternative . . . does not offer
most defendants a meaningful opportunity.”152
In addition, the Supreme Court has used “‘remedy’ to refer to the result a plaintiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable to different kinds of
lawsuits.”153 This makes sense. “[A]s a verb, ‘remedy’ means to set something
right; as a noun, it can mean the fix for that something (e.g., the result).”154
Importantly, Congress, in other statutes, often “uses relief to signify the result of
a remedy; the two terms are not so distinct.”155
Despite this clear guidance—from precedent, plain meaning, and interpretive
canons—courts have denied relief when the effects of the criminal statute no longer authorize the federal prisoner’s detention.
B. “LEGALITY OF DETENTION”

Congress’s use of the terms “legality” and “detention” is highly significant to
the scope of the savings clause. The word “detention” by definition includes challenges to a conviction, but it equally applies to challenges to a sentence.156
Indeed, “detention” is commonly defined as “[k]eeping in custody.”157 And, as
the Supreme Court has previously stated, detention certainly implies imprisonment.158 “Legality” means “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being allowed by
law.”159 Thus, the plain language of this phrase appears to invite claims where the
prisoner’s success on his claim could result in a reduced period of detention.
Based on this understanding, the Wheeler, Brown, and Hill courts concluded that
“detention” includes some sentencing claims.160
152. Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 427–28 (2013) (discussing procedural alternatives in the
context of the opportunity to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim).
153. Litman, supra note 6, at 74 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14, 20–21 (1980) (“Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a more
effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States.”); N.C. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971) (“The prohibition is absolute, and it would inescapably operate to
obstruct the remedies granted by the District Court in the Swann case.”).
154. Litman, supra note 6, at 74 (footnote omitted); see also Remedy, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.
com/en/definition/remedy [https://perma.cc/FMU3-S6FS] (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) (defining
“remedy” as “a means of counteracting or eliminating something undesirable”).
155. Litman, supra note 67, at 488 (footnote omitted); see also 12 U.S.C. § 3755(b)(2) (2012)
(“[O]ther remed[ies] . . . includ[e] . . . relief under an assignment of rents.”); 22 U.S.C. § 1631f(c)
(2012) (“The sole relief and remedy . . . shall be that provided by . . . this section . . . .”); 22 U.S.C. §
1631g(i) (2012) (similar); 22 U.S.C. § 1642b (2012) (“No judicial relief or remedy shall be
available . . . .”).
156. Detention, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “detention” to include “[t]he
act or an instance of holding a person in custody”).
157. See Detention, IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 545 (J. A. Simpson & E. S. C. Weiner eds., 2d
ed. 1989); see also Detention, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 616 (1966) (defining “detention” as “a holding in custody”).
158. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“Freedom from imprisonment [is freedom]
from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint . . . .” (emphasis added)).
159. Legality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (emphasis added).
160. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 598 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that “the savings clause makes no
reference to ‘convictions’ and instead makes relief available when the ‘§ 2255 remedy is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v.
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This interpretation finds support in section 2255’s structure. Other provisions
of section 2255 expressly impose a conviction-only limitation, underscoring that
no such implicit limitation was intended in section 2255(e).161 For example, in
section 2255(h), Congress provided an avenue for a successive collateral attack
based on newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish “that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense.”162 If Congress had
intended to limit savings clause relief to claims challenging only the offense or
conviction, rather than the sentence, it could have easily done so by simply using
the word “conviction” or “offense” in section 2255(e)—just as it did in section
2255(h)(1)—instead of “detention.”163 It did not, and “[i]t is accepted lore that
when Congress uses certain words in one part of a statute, but omits them in
another, an inquiring court should presume that this differential draftsmanship
was deliberate.”164 For these reasons, this Article contends that there can be no
dispute that “detention” includes being able to test the legality of a sentence.165
C. “INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE”

The dispositive inquiry for courts that have denied habeas relief for sentencing
errors is whether the prisoner had a mere opportunity to raise the sentencing claim
at an earlier proceeding.166 Under those courts’ rationales, so long as the prisoner
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 2013))); Brown, 719 F.3d at 588 (“The text of the clause focuses
on the legality of the prisoner’s detention; [§ 2255(e)] does not limit its scope to testing the legality of
the underlying criminal conviction.” (citation omitted)).
161. See Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 573 (2009) (“Where Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). Further, the doctrine of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius counsels against judicial recognition of such a significant limitation. See Reyes-Gaona
v. N.C. Growers Ass’n, 250 F.3d 861, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the expressio unius doctrine
“instructs that where a law expressly describes a particular situation to which it shall apply, what was
omitted or excluded was intended to be omitted or excluded”).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1) (establishing a
period of limitation based on the date of conviction).
163. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 353 (2013) (“Congress’ choice of
words is presumed to be deliberate . . . .”).
164. United States v. Ahlers, 305 F.3d 54, 59–60 (1st Cir. 2002).
165. Some courts and scholars disagree with this Article on this point, arguing instead that detention
should be defined as keeping someone in confinement. See McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill IndustriesSuncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1089 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017);
Jennifer L. Case, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), 103 KY. L.J. 169, 191
(2014) (“‘Detention’ differs from a criminal ‘sentence.’”). This Article agrees with that definition. This
Article disagrees, however, with the notion that someone serving an unlawful sentence does not fall in
that category. Those courts and scholars would limit “detention” only to claims challenging good-time
credits, parole revocation, or other prison disciplinary proceedings.
166. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1085–86 (“Whether circuit precedent ‘was once adverse to a
prisoner has nothing to do with whether his motion to vacate his sentence is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Samak v. Warden, FCC
Coleman-Medium, 766 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2014) (W. Prior, J., concurring))); id. at 1086 (“That
is, he could have made the argument that his prior convictions did not qualify him for an enhanced
sentence under the statute. ‘To test’ the legality of his detention and satisfy the saving clause, a prisoner
is not required ‘to win’ his release.”); id. at 1087 (“Despite circuit precedent, McCarthan could have
tested the legality of his detention by requesting that we reconsider our precedent en banc or by
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had a formal chance to raise his claim in a section 2255 motion—even if there
was existing Supreme Court or circuit court precedent that rendered that claim
futile—the section 2255 proceeding is deemed adequate and effective.167
According to these courts, the savings clause is limited to claims challenging the
“execution of a sentence,” such as “the deprivation of good-time credits or parole
determinations.”168 That means the Meaning, unless a prisoner can meet one of
section 2255(h)’s two exceptions to the successive-motions bar, is that he can
never file another collateral attack on his sentence or conviction.169 This, of course,
reads the savings clause right out of the statute, even for claims based on new decisions that make clear that a defendant was convicted of conduct that is not a
crime.170 Stripping the savings clause of any independent meaning while simultaneously engrafting section 2255(h)’s requirements onto it is antithetical to the text,
purpose, and structure of section 2255.171 Courts must endeavor to apply both statutory provisions fully and prevent one from limiting the legal effect of the other.
This can be done—this Article provides a sound statutory pathway forward.172
Indeed, a federal prisoner should always “be permitted to seek habeas corpus
only if he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a
fundamental defect in his conviction or sentence because the law changed after
his first 2255 motion.”173 In other words, the relevant inquiry should be whether
the prisoner, through no fault of his own, is seeking relief for a fundamental
defect for which he has no source of redress under section 2255.174 It makes little
sense to preclude habeas relief where the defendant had a theoretical opportunity
to test the legality of his conviction or sentence by raising his claim at an earlier
stage, even though that claim was foreclosed by either Supreme Court or circuit
law throughout his sentence, direct appeal, and initial motion under section 2255.
petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.”); see also Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584
(10th Cir. 2011) (“The relevant metric or measure, we hold, is whether a petitioner’s argument
challenging the legality of his detention could have been tested in an initial § 2255 motion.”); id. (“[T]he
clause is concerned with process—ensuring the petitioner an opportunity to bring his argument—not
with substance—guaranteeing nothing about what the opportunity promised will ultimately yield in
terms of relief.”).
167. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086 (“That a court might reject a prisoner’s argument does not render
his ‘remedy by motion’ an inadequate ‘means by which’ to challenge the legality of his sentence.”); id.
at 1087 (“That a particular argument is doomed under circuit precedent says nothing about the nature of
the motion to vacate.”).
168. Id. at 1089, 1092–93.
169. See id. at 1088 (“[A] motion to vacate could be ‘inadequate or ineffective to test’ a prisoner’s
claim about the execution of his sentence because that claim is not cognizable under section 2255(a).”).
170. See, e.g., In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[U]nder Bailey, mere possession
of firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense does not constitute ‘use’ within the
meaning of § 924(c)(1); thus, Jones is incarcerated for conduct that is not criminal.” (footnote omitted)).
171. It is also antithetical to traditional canons of statutory interpretation. Implied repeals of
jurisdictional statutes, for example, are disfavored. See, e.g., Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 643 (2002). This is especially true where, as here, the implied repeal raises
constitutional concerns.
172. See infra Section III.D & Part IV.
173. In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
174. Jones, 226 F.3d at 333 n.3.
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In practice, where erroneous circuit precedent was in effect at the time of the
initial section 2255 motion, it is virtually impossible to meaningfully raise a sentencing or actual innocence claim. Specifically, it is entirely conceivable that every single court to consider the prisoner’s case—the district court, the court of
appeals panel, the en banc panel, and the Supreme Court—could conclude that
the prisoner’s detention is unlawful, and yet also deny relief. For example, as
argued in a recent petition for certiorari filed in Lewis v. English:
� The district judge and appellate panel could conclude that his sentence was
incorrect but that they were bound by the existing circuit precedent;
� All of the court of appeals judges voting on the petition for rehearing en banc
might conclude that the sentence was illegal, but that en banc review was not
“necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions” and not
warranted because the case did not “involve[] a question of exceptional importance”; and
� [The Supreme Court] could conclude that his sentence is unlawful, but that
certiorari is unwarranted because there is no “conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter” and the
decision below did not “so far depart[] from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings . . . as to call for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory
power.”175

Because every single court and jurist in that chain “could conclude that the
prisoner’s detention is unlawful—and yet the prisoner could still be properly
denied relief—necessarily means that in that circumstance, Section 2255 is ‘inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.’”176
Stated more succinctly, a defendant cannot readily test his claim when that
claim is foreclosed by controlling circuit law.177 The district and circuit courts are
bound by precedent; only rare and discretionary action by the en banc court or the
Supreme Court can change the law.178 And when a law-changing decision comes

175. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18–19, Lewis v. English, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (mem.) (No.
18-292), 2018 WL 4298032, at *18–19 (citation omitted) (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) and SUP. CT. R.
10(a) (providing rules for when hearing or rehearing en banc can be ordered and for consideration of
certiorari)).
176. Id. at *19 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)).
177. See MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 278 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]s a panel, we
cannot overrule a prior panel and are bound to apply principles decided by prior decisions of the court to
the questions we address.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting R.R. ex rel. R. v. Fairfax Cty.
Sch. Bd., 338 F.3d 325, 332 n.6 (4th Cir. 2003))).
178. See Adams v. Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This panel is ‘bound by the decisions
of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the
Supreme Court.’” (quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004))); United
States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Under the prior precedent
rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent ‘unless and until it is overruled by this court en
banc or by the Supreme Court.’” (quoting United States v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir.
2003))).
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after the usual avenues of relief—after direct appeal and initial adjudication of a
section 2255 motion—are exhausted, a prisoner had no reasonable opportunity to
rely on it at an earlier time.
Importantly, Supreme Court precedent supports this interpretation. The
Supreme Court has been clear that decisions “narrow[ing] the scope of a criminal
statute by interpreting its terms” are given retroactive effect because such decisions “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an
act that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot
impose upon him.”179 When the Supreme Court or a circuit court interprets a statute and applies its ruling retroactively, but a prisoner is barred from relying on
that interpretation merely because the Supreme Court or circuit court decided the
case after his first section 2255 proceeding was done, section 2255 has certainly
“proved inadequate or ineffective” within the meaning of the savings clause.180
We need only look to the definitions of “inadequate” and “ineffective” and
how those terms of art are used in our constitutional system to confirm this
interpretation.
The term “inadequate” is a term of art that appears in our equity jurisprudence,
which finds in habeas corpus “a comfortable home.”181 And courts have routinely
held that a remedy at law is “inadequate” if it is not “as complete, practical and
efficient as that which equity could afford.”182 By definition, then, section 2255
proves inadequate if that process “does not sufficiently correct the wrong.”183
The term “ineffective,”184 as noted by Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum in her dissent in McCarthan, “is a term of art in Sixth Amendment claims,”185 and is a
common subject of habeas jurisprudence. In this context, as the Supreme Court
has held, ineffective means “constitutionally deficient,” as in ineffective assistance of counsel.186 Thus, when federal prisoners file second or successive
motions asserting that a retroactively applicable new rule of statutory law means

179. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
180. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008).
181. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 647 (2010); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780 (“Habeas
‘is, at its core, an equitable remedy.’” (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995))).
182. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923).
183. Inadequate Remedy at Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also McCarthan v.
Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1105 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (Jordan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (defining “inadequate” as “lacking in effectiveness” (emphasis
omitted)), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).
184. Ineffective, 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 239 (1st ed. 1933) (stating that “ineffective” means
“[o]f such a nature as not to produce . . . the intended [] effect”).
185. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1132 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
186. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 682, 687 (1984); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
71–72 (1932). In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for deciding ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. 466 U.S. at 687. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient.” Id. To prove deficiency, a defendant “must show that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. “Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance” resulted in actual prejudice to the defendant. Id. at
687.
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that their sentences implicate certain constitutional principles—such as separation of powers and due process—section 2255’s remedy, or procedures, are “ineffective to test” the legality of their detentions.187
D. THE RIGHT RESULT

Congress’s words and intent are clear: a federal prisoner is permitted to seek
habeas corpus relief via the savings clause if the prisoner had no reasonable opportunity to obtain earlier judicial correction of a “fundamental defect” in the
prisoner’s conviction or sentence because the law changed after the first section
2255 motion.188 Distilled to its essence, the habeas savings clause has two procedural components—first, the federal prisoner was foreclosed from bringing his
claim at an earlier proceeding (for example, direct appeal or first section 2255
motion) by precedent, and second, there has been an intervening decision of statutory interpretation that is determined to be retroactive. Certainly, these are significant hurdles that will bar many from habeas relief. There is also a substantive
component: whether the claim raises a fundamental defect in the criminal proceedings, either in the conviction or the sentence. Because of these components,
this Article proposes that courts adopt the following doctrinal test to determine
the legality of detention: section 2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence when the claim (1) relies on a retroactively applicable decision of statutory interpretation; (2) was foreclosed by binding precedent at the
time of the initial section 2255 motion; and (3) involves a “fundamental defect”
in the sentence. The issue becomes what types of sentencing errors constitute a
fundamental defect, to which this Article now turns.
IV. FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT: THE CEILING AND THE FLOOR
Admittedly, the more difficult question (than the question of whether section
2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a sentence) is what types
of sentencing errors constitute fundamental defects. There is little precedent that
addresses this issue, and what precedent there is lacks much analysis—the thinking must be that you know it when you see it. There is, however, common sense.
And, as we know, “the most fundamental guide to statutory construction [is]
common sense,”189 and statutes should be constructed to avoid constitutional

187. See infra Part IV.
188. If, for example, a federal prisoner could have brought the claim—and did not—then courts
would likely determine that section 2255 was adequate and effective. In other words, if a federal
prisoner had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at filing a section 2255 motion, meaning there was not
existing precedent foreclosing the claim on her direct appeal or initial section 2255 motion, then section
2255 would likely prove adequate and effective. See, e.g., Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th
Cir. 2006) (listing circuits that have held that prisoners must have “unobstructed procedural shot[s]” at
presenting their claims).
189. First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 869 (4th Cir. 1989); see also
United States v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686, 701 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying a “commonsense” interpretation of
release conditions over an interpretation that is “overly technical”).
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questions190 and absurd results.191 With these principles in mind, this Article
argues that any error that alters the statutory range Congress prescribed for
punishment—the ceiling or the floor—raises separation of powers and due process
concerns. In these instances, a federal prisoner should have the ability to seek
relief under the habeas savings clause, assuming the procedural requirements discussed above are met. If the prisoner lacks this ability, the savings clause is rendered meaningless in violation, arguably, of the Suspension Clause of the United
States Constitution.192 Habeas review, after all, is inextricably intertwined with
both the separation of powers doctrine and the Due Process Clause.193
A. SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERN

Pursuant to the design of our constitutional system, “defining crimes and fixing
penalties are legislative, not judicial, functions.”194 “Congress has the power to
define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion,”
or to provide for individualized sentencing.195 In other words, Congress alone can
set the maximum and minimum terms of imprisonment,196 and together they
define legal boundaries for the punishment of a particular crime.197 Consistent
with the constitutional principle of separation of powers, a defendant has a “constitutional right to be deprived of liberty as punishment for criminal conduct only
to the extent authorized by Congress,” and a violation of that principle “trenches

190. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 385 (2005) (“The canon of constitutional avoidance
comes into play only when, after the application of ordinary textual analysis, the statute is found to be
susceptible of more than one construction; and the canon functions as a means of choosing between
them.”).
191. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) (“It is true that
interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available.”); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661,
667 (1897) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as
will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion
. . . .”).
192. See infra Section IV.C (discussing the Suspension Clause).
193. The Constitution, through its separation of powers, secures individual liberty from unlawful or
arbitrary restraint. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“Security subsists, too, in
fidelity to freedom’s first principles. Chief among these are freedom from arbitrary and unlawful
restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. It is from these
principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief derives.”); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–55 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The very core of liberty secured by our
Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of
the Executive.”); Immigration & Naturalization Sys. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (“At its
historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” (footnote omitted)).
194. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (footnote omitted).
195. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (citing Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27
(1916)).
196. See Evans, 333 U.S. at 486 (observing that “fixing penalties” is a “legislative, not judicial,
function[]”).
197. See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (“A sentencing judge, however, is
not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to
determine the type and extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined.”).
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particularly harshly on individual liberty.”198
A statutory construction error that results in a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum provided by Congress unquestionably implicates that separation
of powers principle.199 In these circumstances, the court—not Congress—
exercises the legislative power to set sentencing ranges. Because this raises serious, constitutional, separation of powers concerns, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
concluded that the imposition of a sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum, where circuit law squarely foreclosed the petitioner from raising
the claim at trial or during an initial section 2255 motion, constitutes a fundamental error that is cognizable under the savings clause and section 2241.200
Similarly, the imposition of an erroneous mandatory minimum sentence implicates this separation of powers principle. The separation of powers concerns
raised by a judicial alteration of the statutory sentencing range are identical
whether the error affects the maximum or minimum term. Congress in each
instance has plenary authority to set the boundaries of punishment, and courts
have no authority to alter them.201
Moreover, drawing a distinction between statutory mandatory-minimum and
mandatory-maximum sentences is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
“[T]he floor of a mandatory range is as relevant to wrongdoers as the ceiling.”202
In fact, mandatory minimum errors can have a far more severe impact: “A mandatory minimum can . . . ‘mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more
than twice as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have
imposed,’” and can “eliminate a sentencing judge’s discretion in its entirety.”203
Thus, an “erroneously-imposed,” recidivism-based “sentencing floor is problematic on its own” because “it create[s] the mistaken impression that the district
court ha[s] no discretion to vary downward from the low end of [the defendant’s
guidelines] range.”204
Put simply, “the separation of powers prohibits a court from imposing criminal
punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact,”205 and “the Constitution
198. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689–90 (1980).
199. See Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 588 (7th
Cir. 2013) (recognizing that a defendant may file a habeas petition because “sentences imposed pursuant to
erroneous interpretations of the mandatory guidelines bear upon the legality of [a defendant’s] detention
for purposes of the savings clause”); see also United States v. Newbold, 791 F.3d 455, 460 (4th Cir. 2015)
(recognizing, in the context of an initial section 2255 motion, that such a sentence raises “separation-ofpowers concerns” because the defendant “received a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him”
(first citing Bryant v. Warden, 738 F.3d 1253, 1283 (11th Cir. 2013); and then quoting United States v.
Shipp, 589 F.3d 1084, 1091 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 598–600 (recognizing a section 2241 habeas petition within meaning of
savings clause where the sentence is above statutory maximum); Brown, 719 F.3d at 588 (same).
201. See Evans, 333 U.S. at 486 (“Congress has exhibited clearly the purpose to proscribe conduct
within its power to make criminal and has not altogether omitted [a] provision for penalty.”).
202. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 113 (2013).
203. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1998) (quoting McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
204. Newbold, 791 F.3d at 460 n.6 (emphasis added).
205. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
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requires substantive rules to have retroactive effect regardless of when a conviction became final.”206 Federal prisoners must be able to vindicate this separation
of powers principle. Without the ability to do so, section 2255’s constitutionality
is doubtful. The savings clause—under this Article’s interpretation—avoids this
problem.207
In fact, that is the point of the savings clause—to “serve[] as a failsafe mechanism to protect § 2255 from unconstitutionality by providing a substitute remedy
for habeas corpus relief that § 2255 otherwise precludes but the Suspension
Clause may require,”208 as the Supreme Court has recently reminded us.209 And
because the Suspension Clause is designed to protect habeas corpus,210 “the
Suspension Clause demands, at a minimum, the availability of habeas corpus
relief to redress federal detention when it violates the very doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review.”211 Habeas review, as the Supreme Court has told us in
Boumediene,212 finds its doctrinal underpinnings in the separation of powers
principle.213 Scholars and courts214 have consistently emphasized the central importance of this aspect of the opinion.215 Therefore, because habeas corpus is intimately intertwined with the separation of powers principle and individual rights,

206. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 729 (2016).
207. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 776 (2008) (describing statutes containing savings
clauses that provide habeas corpus protections).
208. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1122 (11th Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017).
209. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776 (“The [Supreme] Court placed explicit reliance upon [the
savings clause] provisions in upholding [28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the District of Columbia equivalent of
section 2255] against constitutional challenges.” (first citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381
(1977); and then citing United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952))).
210. As Professor Amanda Tyler has explained, “the Court has often premised its analysis of
constitutional habeas claims on the idea that ‘at the absolute minimum, the [Suspension] Clause protects
the writ as it existed when the Constitution was drafted and ratified.’” Amanda L. Tyler, Habeas Corpus
and the American Revolution, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 635, 638 (2015) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746).
211. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1122 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
212. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 (“Chief among [freedom’s first principles] are freedom from
arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of
powers. It is from these principles that the judicial authority to consider petitions for habeas corpus relief
derives.”).
213. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998) (characterizing separation of powers
concerns as “the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review”); see also Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
1257, 1268 (2016) (“Bousley noted that the separation of powers prohibits a court from imposing
criminal punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact.” (citing Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21)).
214. See, e.g., Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1115 n.19 (9th Cir.
2019) (“[T]he writ is an indispensable separation of powers mechanism.”).
215. See, e.g., Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 466 (2010) (describing Boumediene as “rooted in separation of powers
and a concern about executive manipulation of legal rules”); Linda Greenhouse, The Mystery of
Guantánamo Bay, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 1, 18 (2009) (describing Boumediene as “among the Court’s
most important modern statements on the separation of powers”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2111
(2009) (observing that Boumediene supports a view of habeas corpus that is “as much about preserving
the role of the courts as it is about protecting the individual rights of the litigants”).
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detention that violates either principle necessarily tramples upon the doctrinal
foundations of habeas review.216
Significantly, when a prisoner is detained in violation of the separation of
powers principle, “the violation does not somehow become less significant simply because the Supreme Court [or controlling circuit] does not recognize the violation by issuance of a new retroactively applicable rule of law until after the
prisoner’s initial § 2255 claim has been resolved.”217 Indeed, section 2255(h)(2)
allows second or successive claims based on a new retroactively applicable rule
of constitutional law.218 Because “§ 2255 does not authorize second or successive
claims based on a retroactively applicable new rule of statutory law,” the savings
clause must allow prisoners a meaningful opportunity to raise these unlawful sentencing claims “to save § 2255 from unconstitutionality.”219
B. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

1. Stripping the Court of Its Sentencing Discretion
There are also fundamental due process concerns raised where a district court
imposes a sentence at “statutory gunpoint.”220 This occurs when a district court is
stripped of its sentencing discretion because of an incorrect understanding of the
reach of a criminal statute.
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court found a due process violation
because a defendant was erroneously sentenced to a mandatory forty-year term as
a recidivist, thus depriving him of a state law entitlement to have a jury fix his
sentence to any term “not less than ten . . . years.”221 The Court held that a defendant always has a “substantial and legitimate expectation” under the Fourteenth
Amendment to “be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the
[trier of fact] in the exercise of its statutory discretion.”222 Importantly, the Court
rejected the state appellate court’s decision to affirm simply because the
216. See, e.g., Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268 (“[T]he separation of powers prohibits a court from
imposing criminal punishment beyond what Congress meant to enact.”); Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620–21
(“For under our federal system it is only Congress, and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal.
Accordingly, it would be inconsistent with the doctrinal underpinnings of habeas review to preclude
petitioner from relying on our decision in Bailey in support of his claim that his guilty plea was
constitutionally invalid.” (citations omitted)).
217. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1122–23 (11th Cir.
2017) (en banc) (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); id.
(“And the very same concepts that, under the Suspension Clause, demand the retroactivity of new rules
of constitutional or statutory law on initial collateral review—the separation-of-powers doctrine and the
principle of limited government powers—apply with equal force in the context of second or successive
claims for collateral review based on a previously unavailable retroactively applicable rule of
constitutional or statutory law.”).
218. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (2012) (providing that a second or successive motion can be filed
when there is a previously unavailable “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court”).
219. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1123 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting).
220. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 273 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g
granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
221. 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 51(A)(1) (1971)).
222. Id.
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erroneously imposed mandatory sentence was within the authorized range of
punishment.223
Hicks has been found to apply with equal force to sentences imposed by
judges.224 The due process violation in Hicks was not deprivation of the defendant’s right to a jury, but deprivation of his right to have the trier of fact “exercise
. . . its statutory discretion” to impose a just sentence in light of the defendant’s
individual characteristics.225 The same due process interests stated in Hicks are
implicated by the deprivation of all judicial discretion to impose a lower sentence
based on an erroneous interpretation of the sentencing statute. And the Supreme
Court has not limited Hicks to juries simply by describing its holding in light of
its facts. That Hicks arose on direct appeal does not imply that its assessment of
the constitutional harm to the defendant is limited to that context.226
In United States v. Tucker, the Supreme Court considered whether to vacate a
sentence of twenty-five years of imprisonment for armed bank robbery that was
enhanced by two prior constitutionally invalid convictions.227 The Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing
because “there was a reasonable probability that the defective prior convictions
may have led the trial court to impose a heavier prison sentence than it otherwise
would have imposed.”228 The Court explained, “we deal here, not with a sentence
imposed in the informed discretion of a trial judge, but with a sentence founded at
least in part upon misinformation of constitutional magnitude.”229 It reasoned that
“this prisoner was sentenced on the basis of assumptions concerning his criminal
record which were materially untrue.”230 The Court thus concluded that when a
court fails to sentence a defendant within its informed discretion, that defendant’s
due process rights have been violated.231
The liberty interests recognized in Hicks and Tucker are equally implicated by
the total deprivation of discretionary judicial sentencing. This occurs when a district court sentences a person to an enhanced sentence under an erroneous
223. Id. at 345–47.
224. See Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 112 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We think that a judicial error of
that kind [a judge erroneously sentencing a defendant to a mandatory term of imprisonment] would
violate a defendant’s due process protections and we see no reason why a different result would be
reached merely because the jury imposes the sentence.”); Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781, 786 (8th
Cir. 1989) (“When the trial court exercises its [sentencing] discretion under the statute, a defendant has a
legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the court.
That expectation is a liberty interest, protected by due process and enforceable by way of habeas
corpus.”); Prater v. Maggio, 686 F.2d 346, 350 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (“In Hicks, the jury both decided
innocence or guilt and imposed sentence on the defendant. The rule of the case is not, however, limited
to imposition of sentences by juries. In this case, the judge—not the jury—was vested with statutory
discretion in sentencing.”).
225. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346.
226. See, e.g., Chitwood, 889 F.2d at 786.
227. 404 U.S. 443, 444–46 (1972).
228. Id. at 445–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. Id. at 447.
230. Id. (quoting Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948)).
231. Id.
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interpretation of the applicable statute set forth by the controlling circuit court or
the Supreme Court. That person was not sentenced under the correct sentencing
range, thus violating due process.
2. Lack of Access to Courts to Challenge the Legality of the Sentence
There is another due process concern at issue here—that persons should have
access to courts to test whether their detention is lawful.232 This principle is fundamental to our constitutional system. Two observations illustrate this point.
First, the Framers of our Constitution were determined to constitutionalize protections against arbitrary detention. It is not an overstatement to suggest that the
Framers were obsessed with creating safeguards that require the “Executive [to]
answer to an impartial body with a valid cause for depriving one of his or her liberty.”233 They did precisely this by constitutionalizing due process of law in the
Fifth Amendment and habeas corpus through the Suspension Clause.234 This is
important because the writ of habeas corpus—at its core—first “insure[s] the integrity of the process resulting in imprisonment”235 and second, as the Supreme
Court has held, “afford[s] a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal
restraint upon personal liberty.”236 Second, the right to due process and the writ
of habeas corpus are “coextensive.”237 This means “‘due process [wa]s concerned
with how and why a man was imprisoned; the writ was a procedural avenue by
which a prisoner could get those questions before a court’ and be granted a remedy for any due process violations.”238 A brief historical account is necessary for
context and confirmation.
Scholars and courts have written extensively on the relationship between the
Due Process Clause and the writ of habeas corpus in American law.239 Most of
232. This interest is particularly compelling when a person is serving a sentence that, after a
corrected understanding of the applicable statute that resulted in the enhanced sentence, is above the
sentencing guidelines range.
233. Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 384 (2006)
(footnote omitted); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (“[T]he origin of [due
process] was an attempt by those who wrote Magna Carta to do away with the so-called trials of that
period where people were liable to sudden arrest and summary conviction in courts and by judicial
commissions with no sure and definite procedural protections and under laws that might have been
improvised to try their particular cases.”).
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended . . . .”).
235. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3 (1980); see also Ex
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (1 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (“The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ,
known to the common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause.”).
236. Price v. Johntson, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948).
237. Tyler, supra note 233, at 383.
238. Id. at 382 (footnote omitted); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–55 (2004) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has
been freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the Executive.”).
239. See, e.g., DUKER, supra note 235, at 126; Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2012); Redish & McNamara, supra note 44; David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus,
Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 61–65 (2006).
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these works discuss the origins of due process of law. The phrase—due process
of law—derives from the Magna Carta, which declares that “[n]o free man shall
be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled, or in any way ruined,
nor will [the king] go or send against him, [or commit him to prison], except by
the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”240 This contribution
has been said to be “worth more to mankind than all the Greek and Roman classics.”241 The immediate question became what remedy, if any, is available to a
person that is committed to prison without due process of law. The answer is that
person “may have an habeas corpus”—the historical vehicle used to vindicate a
prisoner’s due process right.242 Thus, the very purpose of liberty is to be free from
indefinite imprisonment.
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, stated this principle clearly:
To make imprisonment lawful, it must either be by process from the courts of
judicature, or by warrant from some legal officer having authority to commit
to prison; which warrant must be in writing . . . and express the causes of the
commitment in order to be examined into (if necessary) upon a habeas corpus.
If there be no cause expressed, the gaoler is not bound to detain the prisoner.243

The Founders understood the importance of Blackstone’s words. Alexander
Hamilton quoted from this very passage in The Federalist Papers.244 Moreover,
in the debates leading up to ratification of the Constitution, many prominent officials argued that the “privilege [of the writ] . . . is essential to freedom.”245 Justice
Antonin Scalia succinctly summarized Blackstone’s influence on our constitutional structure: “The two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due
process as the right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which
due process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—found

240. Magna Carta ch. 39, reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis
added); see also Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1079 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The
constitutional due process guarantee traces its roots to the Magna Carta . . . .”); Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 521–24 (1884) (equating Magna Carta’s reference to “the law of the land” with “the due
course and process of the law”).
241. Isaac Franklin Russell, Due Process of Law, 14 YALE L.J. 322, 325–26 (1905).
242. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (photo.
reprt. 1982) (London, W. Rawlins 6th ed. 1681).
243. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136 (footnote omitted).
244. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro, John Dunn, Donald L.
Horowitz & Eileen Hunt Botting eds., 2001). Hamilton contended that “the establishment of the writ of
habeas corpus” would protect against “the practice of arbitrary imprisonments . . . in all ages, the
favorite and most formidable instruments of tyranny.” Id.
245. THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION: AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 108–09
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1891) (statement of Judge Increase Sumner); see also WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 117 (Philadelphia, 2d ed. 1829) (“It is the great
remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the
judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the
injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors.”).
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expression in the Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension Clauses.”246
One of the leading experts in habeas law, Professor Amanda Tyler, has—in
many works—discussed this constitutional marriage between the due process
clause and the writ of habeas corpus.247 She persuasively argues that:
This marriage of constitutional protections follows because “[t]o hold someone in detention without affording her a judicial forum to test whether the
detention is lawful . . . is the very essence of a deprivation of liberty without
due process.” Although due process has come to mean many things over time,
at its most fundamental and as it relates to the Great Writ, the guarantee of due
process promises that the Executive must answer to an impartial body with a
valid cause for depriving one of his or her liberty. Indeed, that the habeas remedy is so crucial to the realization of this due process guarantee suggests that
“had there been no Suspension Clause, such a remedy would still be implicitly
mandated by the Constitution.” This conclusion follows, moreover, because
the Suspension Clause should be read “as an integrated component of a
broader constitutional scheme of rights to judicial review and judicial
remedies.”248

Professor Tyler is right. Federal prisoners always have—absent a valid suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Congress—the due process right to ask a
court to determine whether their detentions are lawful.249 And, when a person is
serving an unlawful sentence, due process requires that the principle of finality
must yield to the imperative of courts correcting fundamentally unjust sentences.
Any other interpretation cuts at the heart of our constitutional structure.
Indeed, another aspect of our constitutional structure that is implicated is the
Suspension Clause, which ensures that the writ of habeas corpus—that is so
deeply rooted in the separation of powers principle and due process—cannot be
suspended.
C. SUSPENSION OF THE GREAT WRIT

The Suspension Clause of the Constitution provides: “The Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion
or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”250 This provision “secure[s] the
writ [of habeas corpus] and ensure[s] its place in our legal system.”251 Because
the Suspension Clause protects the writ of habeas corpus under the Constitution,
246. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 555–56 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. See Amanda L. Tyler, A “Second Magna Carta”: The English Habeas Corpus Act and the
Statutory Origins of the Habeas Privilege, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1949 (2016); Amanda L. Tyler, The
Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012); Tyler, supra note
210.
248. Tyler, supra note 233, at 383–84 (footnotes omitted).
249. See id. at 384 (“Accordingly, in the absence of a valid suspension, an American citizen detained
on American soil (our paradigmatic habeas petitioner) enjoys at a minimum the due process right to ask
a court to inquire into the cause for his or her detention.” (footnote omitted)).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
251. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 740 (2008).
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the Supreme Court has stated that the savings clause—to the extent that the rest
of section 2255 does not provide for such review—ensures access to the writ of
habeas corpus commensurate with what the Suspension Clause constitutionally
may require.252
In fact, failure to interpret the savings clause in this way would, as the
Supreme Court has warned, raise “serious question[s] about the constitutionality
of [section 2255].”253 Why? Because through its jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court has treated the savings clause as a constitutional failsafe for section
2255.254 In other words, the Suspension Clause protects second and successive
claims that section 2255(h) fails to permit. It does this through the savings
clause.255 If the savings clause did not protect these claims—both actual innocence and unlawful sentencing claims—section 2255 would likely violate the
Suspension Clause.256
This conclusion does not appear to be in dispute. In Boumediene, a fairly recent
landmark decision that comprehensively interpreted the Suspension Clause, the
Supreme Court held that the Suspension Clause is violated when a prisoner is
denied “a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to
‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.”257 Where, as here,
the application of the statutory bar in section 2255(h) would deny a federal prisoner such a meaningful opportunity to show that he was sentenced under an erroneous application of statutory law—thus raising both separation of powers and
due process concerns—the savings clause must apply to avoid an unconstitutional
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. There must be an adequate substitute
procedure for habeas corpus—itself an indispensable separation of powers and

252. See id. at 776 (“The [Supreme] Court placed explicit reliance upon [the savings clause]
provisions in upholding [28 U.S.C. § 2255 and the District of Columbia equivalent of § 2255] against
constitutional challenges.” (first citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977); and then citing
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952))).
253. Id. at 776 (quoting Swain, 430 U.S. at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
254. See, e.g., Hayman, 342 U.S. at 223 (“In a case where the Section 2255 procedure is shown to be
‘inadequate or ineffective,’ the Section provides that the habeas corpus remedy [in § 2241] shall remain
open to afford the necessary hearing.” (footnote omitted)).
255. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776. Because courts “would be required to answer the difficult
question of what the Suspension Clause protects is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the
constitutional questions that would be raised by concluding that review was barred entirely.”
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 n.13 (2001); see also Gerald L.
Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961, 980
(1998) (noting that “reconstructing habeas corpus law [for purposes of a Suspension Clause analysis]
would be a difficult enterprise, given fragmentary documentation, state-by-state disuniformity, and
uncertainty about how state practices should be transferred to new national institutions”).
256. Section 2255(e) is referred to as the “savings” clause for a reason. “By permitting a federal
prisoner to bring a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where § 2255 proves [an] ‘inadequate
or ineffective remedy to test the legality of his detention,’ § 2255(e) operates to ‘save’ § 2255 from
violating the Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution.” Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d
1293, 1329 (11th Cir. 2011) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
257. 553 U.S. at 779 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 302).
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due process mechanism—to be in compliance with the Suspension Clause.258
Additionally, as the Brennan Center has posited, “[o]nly Congress can suspend
the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary detention, and only under specific,
narrow circumstances not present” when a federal prisoner is serving a constitutionally suspect sentence.259 The Supreme Court has confirmed this constitutional
principle on several occasions.260 The Suspension Clause thus applies to federal
prisoners “with undiminished force.”261 Therefore, “[t]o effectuate the role of the
Great Writ within the scheme of Separation of Powers [and the Due Process
Clause] . . . the district court must have power to end [federal prisoners’] unsupportable detention.”262
*****
A person should serve a sentence within the range Congress prescribed as determined by the district court after complete consideration of all relevant factors. Not
only is this consistent with common sense, but is also consistent with constitutional principles. When a sentencing error moves the ceiling or floor, the effect is a
fundamental defect in the criminal process that the savings clause is designed to
prevent. Each of these issues were front and center in United States v. Surratt.
V. THE CASE: RAYMOND SURRATT JR.
The facts of United States v. Surratt teed up all of the issues discussed above.
The public was watching this case—another perceived injustice—closely: a
young, African-American man serving a life sentence for selling drugs that everyone, including the government and district court, believed was unjust.263 Right
before the entire Fourth Circuit was going to take a swing, President Barack
Obama commuted Surratt’s sentence, mooting Surratt’s appeal.264 These facts,

258. Id. at 765 (“These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question in the
cases now before us, for the writ of habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring
the separation of powers.”).
259. Brief for the Association of the Bar of The City of New York, The Brennan Center for Justice at
the New York University School of Law, the Constitution Project, the Rutherford Institute, and the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8,
Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1265288, at *8 [hereinafter Brief for
Brennan Center et al.]. Congress has on four occasions “authorized executive suspension of the writ . . . .
All such suspensions were accompanied by clear statements expressing congressional intent to suspend
the writ and limiting the suspension to periods during which the predicate conditions (rebellion or
invasion) existed.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2006) (citing DUKER, supra
note 235, at 149, 178 n.190) (providing justifications for each of the four times the writ was suspended).
260. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[U]nless Congress acts to suspend it,
the Great Writ of habeas corpus allows the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this
delicate balance of governance, serving as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in
the realm of detentions.”).
261. Brief for Brennan Center et al., supra note 259, at 8.
262. Id.; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783 (holding that for the writ to have meaning and fulfill
its constitutional role, it “must be effective”).
263. See, e.g., Marimow, supra note 15.
264. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 219 (4th Cir. 2017) (“By order dated February 14, 2017,
the court directed the parties to address the impact of the President’s commutation of Appellant Surratt’s
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however, illustrate the heart of this Article’s argument: any error that alters the
statutory sentencing range Congress prescribed for punishment—the ceiling or
the floor—is cognizable under the savings clause.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Raymond Surratt Jr. was charged with “conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute” crack and powder cocaine in violation of the Controlled Substances
Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A) and 846.265 Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851,
the government filed an information disclosing its intent to seek enhanced penalties based on Surratt’s four previous convictions in North Carolina: “(1) a 1996
conviction for felony possession of cocaine; (2) a 1997 conviction for felony possession of cocaine; (3) a 1997 conviction for felony possession of cocaine and
maintaining a place for storage and sale; and (4) a 1998 conviction for sale and
delivery of cocaine.”266 The maximum sentence Surratt could have received for
the 1996 and 1997 convictions was eight months for each offense.267
On February 4, 2005, Surratt pleaded guilty to one count of the conspiracy
charges.268 The plea agreement specified that Surratt potentially faced a mandatory term of life imprisonment because the CSA imposed a statutory minimum
sentence of life imprisonment for anyone with two or more prior convictions for
a felony drug offense.269 At his rule 11 hearing270 on February 4, 2005, Surratt
affirmed to the magistrate judge that he understood how the sentencing guidelines
might apply to his case, that he might receive a mandatory term of life imprisonment, and that if the sentence was more severe than expected, he would be bound
by his plea.271

sentence and, in particular, the questions of mootness and jurisdiction. Upon consideration of the
responses to the court’s order, the court finds this appeal to be moot.”).
265. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 146851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
266. Id. at 244–45.
267. Surratt’s June 26, 1996 conviction was for a violation of North Carolina General Statute § 9095(a)(3), a North Carolina Class I felony. See Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C.
2255; Alternative Petition for Relief Under 28 U.S.C. 2241; Alternative Petition for Writ of Coram
Nobis at 3, United States v. Surrat, 445 Fed. App’x 64 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 3:04-cr-00250-RJC)
[hereinafter Surrat’s Motion to Vacate]. His prior record level under state law was I, meaning the
maximum punishment he could have received for this conviction was eight months of imprisonment.
Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90-95(a), 15A-1340-17(c), (d) (West 2018). Surratt’s June 27,
1997 convictions were Class I felonies with a prior record level of II, for which he could receive no more
than eight months of imprisonment. See Surratt’s Motion to Vacate, supra.; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
15A-1340-17(c), (d) (West 2013).
268. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:08cv181, 2011 WL 815714, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2011).
269. See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The statutory mandatory minimum sentences were recently
lessened by the Fair Sentencing Act and the First Step Act. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372; First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 401(a)(2), 132
Stat. 5194, 5220.
270. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (detailing the plea procedure in criminal cases).
271. See Surratt v. United States, No. 3:08cv181, 2011 WL 815714, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 25, 2011);
Surratt, 797 F.3d at 245.
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At this point, the Fourth Circuit had yet to rule in United States v. Harp, which
was decided May 4, 2005.272 In Harp—which would later be overturned by
United States v. Simmons273—the Fourth Circuit considered whether a defendant’s prior conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana made him
a career offender subject to an enhanced sentence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.274 The
case turned on whether the controlled substance offense was “punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”275 The Fourth Circuit held that a
prior conviction under North Carolina law qualified as such a felony if the maximum aggravated sentence that could have been imposed for that crime exceeded
one year, regardless of whether the sentence actually imposed on the defendant
was less than one year.276
Surratt’s sentencing hearing took place in October 2005, by which time Harp
had been issued.277 Under the CSA, like in Harp, a prior felony drug offense is
defined as an offense “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”278
The maximum penalty possible for three of Surratt’s prior convictions was only
eight months each for Surratt in his individual circumstances, but the maximum
aggravated sentences permissible under North Carolina law were more than one
year.279 Thus, Harp dictated that all four of Surratt’s previous convictions
counted as felonies.280
Surratt’s preliminary sentencing guidelines range was calculated in his presentence report as 188–235 months of imprisonment.281 However, at the time Surratt
was sentenced, the statutory minimum under the CSA for someone with two or
more felony drug convictions was life imprisonment.282 Because this mandatory
minimum was greater than the maximum of the recommended guideline range,
Surratt’s penalty was a life term.283 At sentencing, the district court stated it “had
no other option” but to sentence Surratt accordingly, which it did.284 Surratt
appealed, but the Fourth Circuit affirmed his conviction and sentence.285
272. 406 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2005), overruled by United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir.
2011).
273. 649 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Harp no longer remains good law.”).
274. Harp, 406 F.3d at 244–45.
275. Id. at 245 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2004)).
276. See id. at 246–47.
277. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 245 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 146851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
278. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (2012).
279. See supra note 267. The parties agreed that only the 1998 conviction qualified as a “felony drug
offense” under the CSA. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en
banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
280. Harp, 406 F.3d at 245.
281. See United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 223 (4th Cir. 2007).
282. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012); see also First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, §
401(a)(2), 132 Stat. 5194, 5220 (lowering the statutory mandatory minimum).
283. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2004).
284. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g
en banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
285. United States v. Surratt, 215 F. App’x 222, 224 (4th Cir. 2007).
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On April 22, 2008, Surratt filed a pro se motion to vacate his sentence under
section 2255 due to ineffective assistance of counsel.286 He also requested a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on amended sentencing
guidelines application to crack cocaine offenses.287 The district court denied
Surratt’s petition on February 24, 2011.288
Six months after the district court denied Surratt’s motion to vacate his sentence, the Fourth Circuit issued Simmons. In Simmons, the Fourth Circuit considered the same “punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” language in
the CSA.289 This time the Fourth Circuit held that instead of looking at the maximum aggravated sentence that could possibly be imposed under North Carolina
law, the question of whether a prior conviction can be considered a felony
depended on the “conviction itself.”290
If Surratt were sentenced for the same CSA violation today, under the Fourth
Circuit decision in Simmons, his 1996 and 1997 convictions would not qualify as
felonies and he would not face a mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment.
Because, under Simmons, Surratt possessed only one CSA predicate felony, the
statutory mandatory minimum for someone with one qualifying offense is not a
life term, but twenty years.291 Life with the possibility of parole was actually the

286. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014).
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
290. See id. at 244 (citing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 576 (2010)).
291. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2012). In August 2010, Congress enacted the Fair Sentencing
Act, which amended section 841(b)(1) to reduce the disparity between sentences for powder and crack
cocaine offenses. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a), 124 Stat. 2372, 2372.
“The amendment, which remains in effect, responded to both public and judicial outcry regarding the
‘disproportionate and unjust effect’ of the 100-to-1 powder-to-crack quantity ratio on crack offenders,
who were disproportionately minorities.” United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 223 (4th Cir. 2017)
(Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal) (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 93 (2007)); see
also Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 268 (2012) (“[T]he public had come to understand sentences
embodying the 100-to-1 ratio as reflecting unjustified race-based differences.”); William Spade, Jr.,
Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1266–
68 (1996) (explaining that implementation of the 100-to-1 ratio led to significantly higher incarceration
rates for black and Hispanic offenders relative to white offenders and significantly longer sentences for
black offenders relative to white offenders).
The Supreme Court held in Dorsey that the Fair Sentencing Act applies retroactively, meaning that
the statute’s “more lenient mandatory minimums apply to offenders whose unlawful conduct took place
before, but whose sentencing took place after, the date [the Fair Sentencing] Act took effect.” 567 U.S.
at 272. As Judge James A. Wynn Jr., explained in his dissent from the Fourth Circuit’s 2017 Surratt
decision,
Had the powder-to-crack quantity ratio established by the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at
the time of his conviction, [Surratt] would have been sentenced under Section 841(b)(1)(B),
rather than Section 841(b)(1)(A), because of the Fair Sentencing Act’s revised quantity threshold for receiving the higher mandatory minimums set forth in Section 841(b)(1)(A).
855 F.3d at 223 (Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal) (alteration in original) (citing 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A), (B)). Under Section 841(b)(1)(B), because Surratt only had one predicate felony
drug offense, he would face a mandatory minimum term of ten years of imprisonment, not life.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
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statutory maximum.292 Surratt, however, was sentenced to a mandatory minimum
term of life imprisonment.
B. SURRATT’S MOTION TO VACATE HIS SENTENCE

On August 15, 2012, Surratt filed a motion in the district court to vacate his
sentence under section 2255 and section 2241.293 Surratt argued that he was entitled to relief under section 2255 because, in light of Simmons, his sentence was
not authorized by law.294 In those proceedings, the government agreed that
Surratt was entitled to resentencing under section 2255(e) and section 2241, arguing that Surratt was not eligible for the aggravated sentence he received.295
On April 7, 2014, the district court held a hearing on Surratt’s motion and
acknowledged that it would have imposed less than a life sentence at the original
sentencing hearing if it had the authority to do so.296 The district judge stated, “I
was required to impose a life sentence,” as well as “I’ll not forget the frustration I
felt in doing that because I did think it was an unjust sentence.”297 The court further stated that its “inability” to consider the possibility of a lesser sentence
“based on all relevant evidence has troubled the Court to this day.”298
Nevertheless, the court denied Surratt’s motion, holding that the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in In re Jones precluded any relief for sentencing errors.299
Jones involved a slightly different challenge under section 2255(e) and section
2241. Jones had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using a firearm
during the commission of a drug offense, “based on the discovery of four firearms
in a locked closet.”300 After his first section 2255 motion, the Supreme Court
decided Bailey v. United States, which held that the government must prove
“active employment” to establish “use” of a firearm under the statute.301 Without
a new, retroactively applicable rule of constitutional law, this change in statutory
interpretation did not satisfy the requirements for a successive petition under section 2255(h), so Jones invoked the savings clause of section 2255(e), arguing that
section 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”302 The Fourth Circuit agreed, especially because “Bailey establishes that a
prisoner whose conviction rests on an improper definition of ‘use’ is incarcerated

292. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).
293. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014).
294. Id. at *3, *6.
295. See United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting), reh’g
en banc granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015) (“Both parties agree that Surratt is ineligible to
spend the rest of his life in prison.”).
296. See Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *3 (W.D.N.C. May 16,
2014).
297. Surratt, 797 F.3d at 273 (Gregory, J., dissenting).
298. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014).
299. Id. at *6.
300. In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 334 (4th Cir. 2000).
301. 516 U.S. 137, 143 (1995).
302. Jones, 226 F.3d at 329 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)).

328

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 108:287

for conduct that is not criminal.”303 The Fourth Circuit therefore concluded that
section 2255 is “inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of a conviction”
when three criteria are met:
(1) [A]t the time of conviction, settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court
established the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner’s
direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that
the conduct of which the prisoner was convicted is deemed not to be criminal;
and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy the gatekeeping provisions of § 2255
because the new rule is not one of constitutional law.304

Citing this three-part test, the district court held that Surratt could not satisfy
the second requirement: that the substantive law changed such that the conduct
for which Surratt was convicted was no longer criminal.305 Ultimately the district
court found it was “not at liberty to deviate” from Jones and could not recognize
“something less than decriminalized conduct [to] support[] proceeding through
the savings clause portal to section 2241 relief.”306 The court further found that
due process is not violated by preventing a defendant from invoking the savings
clause to “remedy a sentence based on a mandatory minimum punishment later
deemed invalid.”307 Surratt appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Because both parties
agreed that the savings clause permitted Surratt to challenge his unlawful sentence, the Fourth Circuit appointed an amicus to present any other potential interpretations of the savings clause.308
On appeal, a divided panel309 of the Fourth Circuit concluded that “§ 2255(e)’s
text does not permit Surratt to raise his claim under section 2241.”310
Specifically, the majority denied Surratt’s section 2241 petition because he
was not actually of the underlying conviction and could not—“absent verbal
and logical gymnastics”— be “actually innocent” of a sentence enhancement.311 The majority left open the possibility that section 2241 could support
a prisoner’s challenge to a sentence exceeding the statutory maximum, but
found this exception inapplicable because Surratt’s sentence was lawful—the
303. Id. at 333.
304. Id. at 333–34.
305. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *5 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014).
306. Id.
307. Id. at *9.
308. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, No. 14-6851
(4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2015).
309. Judge Gregory issued a scathing and well-reasoned dissent. Judge Gregory anchored his
argument on the history and text of the “Great Writ,” tracked the impact of legislation on it, and then
applied those principles and Fourth Circuit precedent to determine that the majority’s holding violates
them all. Id. at 270–76 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The core of his argument resides in the constitutional
prohibition on suspension of the writ. See id. Judge Gregory analyzed the text, applying “the traditional
savings clause analysis” (the analysis set out in Jones) to show why section 2255 is “inadequate or
ineffective” and why section 2241 is available to address a misapplied enhancement. Id. at 273–76.
310. Id. at 251 (majority opinion).
311. Id. at 249–50.
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statutory maximum sentence authorized for Surratt’s conviction was life
imprisonment, which his mandatory minimum life sentence did not exceed.312
Surratt was thus barred from seeking habeas relief under section 2241 for a
misapplied mandatory minimum life sentence.313
Surratt petitioned the Fourth Circuit to rehear the case en banc; the court
granted his request and vacated the panel decision.314 The en banc argument
occurred on March 23, 2016.315 However, “[o]n January 19, 2017—nearly
10 months after the rehearing en banc, and still without a decision from [the Fourth
Circuit]—[President Obama] commuted [Surratt’s] life sentence to a 200-month
term of imprisonment.”316 Surratt’s “commutation was part of a broader effort by
the President to commute the sentences of inmates sentenced in accordance with
the severe mandatory minimums and unjust powder-to-crack quantity ratio applicable under the earlier version of Section 841(b)(1).”317
*****
Although there is an ongoing debate about whether the President’s pardon
mooted Surratt’s appeal,318 there should be no debate that Surratt was entitled to
relief via the savings clause, at least under this Article’s interpretation of that
clause.
C. SURRATT WAS ENTITLED TO HABEAS RELIEF

Under this Article’s interpretation of the savings clause, Surratt was entitled to
habeas relief because section 2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his sentence. Surratt’s claim relied on a retroactively applicable decision of
statutory interpretation, was foreclosed by binding precedent at the time of his
initial section 2255 motion, and involved a fundamental defect. The first two
conditions—retroactivity and foreclosure—are easily satisfied here. Simmons
was decided on August 17, 2011, after Surratt’s direct appeal and his first section
2255 motion were filed on April 22, 2008.319 Simmons, declared retroactive by
Miller v. United States,320 is a case about statutory interpretation—namely, the interpretation of federal sentencing law—not constitutional law. Therefore, Surratt

312. Id. at 255–57, 269.
313. Id. at 269.
314. Id. at 240.
315. United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218, 218 (4th Cir. 2017).
316. Id. at 224 (Wynn, J., dissenting from dismissal).
317. Id.
318. See id. at 221. In his dissent from dismissal, Judge Wynn argued that, because Surratt still has a
“concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation” and because the Court could grant
effectual relief, the case was not moot. Id. at 225–27. Specifically, Judge Wynn contended that Surratt
would likely face a shorter sentence than the one imposed by the commutation. Id. at 232. Judge
Wilkinson disagreed, stating that “[t]he President’s commutation order simply closes the judicial door.”
Id. at 219 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
319. Surratt v. United States, No. 3:12-CV-513, 2014 WL 2013328, at *2 (W.D.N.C. May 16, 2014);
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237, 237 (4th Cir. 2011).
320. 735 F.3d 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Simmons announced a new substantive rule that is
retroactive on collateral review . . . .”).
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cannot take advantage of a second or successive petition through section 2255(h). In
other words, Surratt never “had an unobstructed procedural shot at filing a § 2255
motion to take advantage of” the change brought about by Simmons.321
In addition, the error is of constitutional magnitude. The Simmons error in
Surratt’s case took away the floor of his sentencing range and tied the hands of
the district court such that it was prevented from fashioning an individualized
sentence within the legally correct range intended by Congress. This raises the serious and significant separation of powers and due process concerns discussed in
Part IV that established the fundamental character defect in Surratt’s case.
Any suggestion that Surratt’s sentence is legal because it is within the applicable statutory maximum—as the majority did in Surratt—is, as in Hicks v.
Oklahoma, no more than a “frail conjecture” that cannot support “[s]uch an arbitrary disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty.”322 Indeed, the conjecture is
even less substantial in Surratt’s case than in Hicks because the district court
made clear that it believes Surratt’s life sentence to be “unjust” and would not
have imposed it but for the erroneous belief that it was compelled to do so by the
statutory mandatory minimum. More importantly, the Supreme Court in Hicks
found a due process violation even though the resulting sentence was “within the
range of punishment that could have been imposed in any event.”323
Surratt’s case is important because it underscores what is at stake: years of
Surratt’s life would have wasted away in prison serving the “penultimate”324 sentence because the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted the sentencing statute
involved in his case. Even worse, the Fourth Circuit in its initial panel decision
would have allowed Surratt no relief, the same result the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits would reach. Surratt’s “long-final” sentence, according to these
courts, “must remain just that: final.”325 But, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held, the finality principle—the notion that at some point the criminal justice process has to come to an end—“must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.”326 Finality, in other words, should never be
elevated over the legal rule that people should not be in prison because of an
unlawful conviction or sentence.
Yet, these courts take refuge behind the finality principle, which, consequently,
deprives federal prisoners “of the most basic liberties” and strips away all hope of

321. Rice v. Rivera, 617 F.3d 802, 807 (4th Cir. 2010).
322. See 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980); see also Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 245
(1998) (“[Because a] mandatory minimum can . . . ‘mandate a minimum sentence of imprisonment more
than twice as severe as the maximum the trial judge would otherwise have imposed’ . . . . the risk of
unfairness to a particular defendant is no less, and may well be greater, when a mandatory minimum
sentence, rather than a permissive maximum sentence, is at issue.” (citations omitted) (quoting
McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
323. Hicks, 447 U.S. at 345 (footnote omitted).
324. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
325. See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 2011).
326. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982). For the reasons stated in supra note 37, the finality
principle, in my view, is not frustrated under this Article’s proposal.

2019]

SAVING JUSTICE

331

restoration, “except perhaps by executive clemency—the remote possibility of
which does not mitigate the harshness of the sentence.”327 This result is—and
will always be—an extraordinary miscarriage of justice of constitutional proportions. In these cases, courts “must allow a prisoner to invoke the savings clause if
the Great Writ, which has always been ‘a bulwark against convictions that violate
fundamental fairness,’ is to mean anything at all.”328 This Article’s proposal provides a bright-line test that is consistent with the text of the savings clause, provides clarity, upholds our constitutional values, and, most importantly, ensures
that justice will be served.
CONCLUSION
This Article’s interpretive framework, if adopted, will certainly require
courts to review more cases. But these are precisely the cases courts must
review to give people the confidence that the criminal justice system is working
fairly. When courts correct their own mistakes concerning statutory interpretation, and that correction exposes a fundamental defect in sentencing—any
error that alters the statutory range Congress prescribed for punishment—
courts must address that issue head on. The mechanism to do so is the savings
clause—the clause that should ensure that federal prisoners are not serving
unlawful sentences and that justice is done. And, there is no basis—not in text
or through any canons of interpretation—to deny federal prisoners access to
the courts through the savings clause. The criminal justice process, after all,
should never “rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.”329

327. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 69–70 (2010).
328. United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240, 270 (4th Cir. 2015) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Engle, 456 U.S. at 126), reh’g granted, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. 2015).
329. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).

